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Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974:
The Reagan Record
Alan F. Holmer*
and Judith Hippler Bello"
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 allows a U.S. industry to obtain relief
from fairly traded imports that seriously injure a U.S. industry. A domestic
industry's right to relief from imports is not certain, however. The President
has discretion to grant or deny any relief sought. The authors of this article, the
Deputy U.S. Trade Representative and General Counsel to the U.S. Trade
Representative, discuss cases in which the ITC recommended import relief for
U.S. industry, but the President denied relief. They argue that the Administra-
tion granted substantial relief in most cases in which the International Trade
Commission found injury, and properly denied relieffor economically justifiable
reasons in two cases. The authors also argue that Executive discretion to deny
import relief to domestic industry is a necessary part of U.S. trade policy and
should not be removed from section 201, as several early versions of the Omni-
bus Trade Bill proposed.
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (1974 Act),'
is a central element of U.S. import relief laws. While the President
has been criticized for "blue pencil[ing] Section 201 of the Trade Act
out of the statute books," 2 we believe such charges are ungrounded.
Inasmuch as amendments to section 201 have been central to con-
gressional consideration of trade legislation, we consider it timely to
review the record of the Reagan Administration in implementing
section 201. We will also analyze various legislative proposals to
amend this statute.
I. Background of Section 201
In the past half-century, the United States has negotiated a vari-
ety of trade agreements that reduced tariffs and increased discipline
Deputy U.S. Trade Representative.
* General Counsel to the U.S. Trade Representative.
19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2 Following the President's September 1985 decision involving nonrubber footwear,
see infra note 29, Senator John C. Danforth wrote:
The clear message from the White House is that if the shoe industry does not
qualify for relief, no industry will qualify. If 78 percent import penetration in
shoes is no basis for remedy, then textiles and apparel, with less than 25
percent import penetration, cannot hope to qualify. In effect, the President
has blue-penciled Section 201 of the Trade Act out of the statute books.
Danforth, A Rip in the Trade Laws, Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1985, at A23, col. 1.
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over other barriers to trade. At the insistence of U.S. negotiators,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAT) 3 contains an
"escape clause"4 provision which permits GAT member countries
in special circumstances to raise duties or restrict imports even when
they would otherwise be obligated not to do so.
The escape clause is found in section 201 of the 1974 Act.5 The
Senate Finance Committee's report accompanying the 1974 Act de-
scribes the reasoning behind this provision:
For many years, the Congress has required that an "escape clause"
be included in each trade agreement. The rationale for the "escape
clause" has been, and remains, that as barriers to international trade
are lowered, some industries and workers inevitably face serious in-
jury, dislocation and perhaps economic extinction. The "escape
clause" is aimed at providing temporary relief for an industry suffer-
ing from serious injury, or the threat thereof, so that the industry
will have sufficient time to adjust to the freer international
competition.
6
The period of relief provided under section 201 gives "addi-
tional time to permit a seriously injured domestic industry to adjust
and to become competitive again under relief measures and, at the
same time, to create incentives for the industry to adjust, if possible,
to competitive conditions in the absence of long-term import
restrictions." '7
Unlike most other U.S. trade statutes,8 section 201 focuses
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 27 U.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter GAIT].
4 If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obliga-
tions incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff
concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that con-
tracting party in such increased quantitierand under such conditions as to
cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like
or directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in re-
spect of such product, and to the extent and for such time as may be neces-
sary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or
in part or to withdraw or modify the concession.
Id. Art. XIX(l)(a), 61 Stat. at A58-A59.
5 Actually, the escape clause is found in sections 201-203 of the Trade Act of 1974,
as amended. However, it is normally referred to as, and will be referred to in this article
as, "section 201." See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253.
6 S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1974).
7 H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1973).
8 Most U.S. trade laws cover trade practices considered unfair as well as injurious.
See, e.g., the countervailing duty (CVD) and antidumping laws. The CVD law is composed
of two sections. Congress replaced earlier CVD provisions with § 303 of the Tariff Act of
1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590, 687, amended by the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618,
§ 331, 88 Stat. 1978, 2049-52 (1975), and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-39, §§ 101-107, 93 Stat. 144, 150 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982 & Supp. III
1985)). More recently, Congress enacted the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, which added
title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930 and also includes the antidumping law. Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-
167 7g (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
But cf. § 406 of the 1974 Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982), which authorizes the President
to provide relief if he determines that imports of a product of a Communist country are
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solely on injury to a U.S. industry caused by all imports, regardless of
whether they are fairly or unfairly traded.9 Also, unlike most other
statutes, escape clause relief is not "free." 10 When import relief im-
pairs a tariff concession, section 201 obligates the United States to
compensate trading partners whose trade is damaged. If the United
States does not compensate its trading partners, the escape clause
entitles them to retaliate against U.S. exports. Often U.S. exporters
represent the nation's most competitive industries. The combina-
tion of import relief-retaliation can thus result in a competitive bene-
fit to a weak, contracting industry at the expense of the stronger
exporting industries."
Any section 201 case consists of two phases. In the first phase,
the International Trade Commission (Commission) must determine
"whether an article is being imported into the United States in such
increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or
the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like
or directly competitive with the imported article."' 2
If the Commission finds serious injury or even threat of serious
injury, it recommends the amount and nature of import relief neces-
sary to prevent or remedy the injury.' 3 The Commission must make
both the injury finding and relief recommendation to the President
within six months of the filing of the petition.
The President then has sixty days to determine whether to pro-
vide import relief and, if so, the method and amount. In making this
determination, the President retains broad discretion' 4 and is re-
causing market disruption in the United States. Like section 201, section 406 focuses ex-
clusively on injury (whether certain rapidly increasing imports are a significant cause or
threat of material injury).
9 However, if during the course of its investigation, the Commission finds that in-
creased imports are attributable in part to dumping, subsidies, or other unfair trade prac-
tices, it is required promptly to notify the appropriate agency so that action may be taken
under the relevant unfair trade statute. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(6) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
10 The Senate Finance Committee Report accompanying the 1974 Act states that:
This provision is designed to assure that the United States will not needlessly
invoke the escape clause (article XIX of the GAT') and will not become in-
volved in granting compensatory concessions or inviting retaliation in situa-
tions where the appropriate remedy may be action under one or more U.S.
laws against unfair competition for which no compensation or retaliation is in
order.
S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 6, at 123.
11 The prospect of compensation or retaliation is a significant factor in the Presi-
dent's decision-making process under section 202. See infra notes 103-05, 121-36, 149-58,
169-70, 178-80, 189-94 and accompanying text.
12 Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(l), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. II 1985).
Prior to the 1974 Act, escape clause relief under U.S. domestic law required a causal
link between increased imports and trade agreement concessions. S. REP. No. 1298, re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 7186, 7263-64.
13 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
14 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c) (1982) requires the President to take into account:
(1) information and advice from the Secretary of Labor on the extent to
which workers in the industry have applied for, are receiving, or are likely to
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quired to consider a wide range of factors relevant to the national
economic interest.' 5
Section 203(c)(1) of the 1974 Act' 6 provided for a two-house
legislative veto of the President's determination on import relief
when it differed from the Commission's recommendation. Section
203(c)(1) authorized Congress to override the President's denial of
import relief or to disapprove the type or amount of relief selected
by the President by passing a concurrent resolution by the House of
Representatives and the Senate. Passage of a congressional resolu-
tion required the President to put into effect the relief which the
Commission had recommended. 17
In Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha,t8 however, the
Supreme Court held that the legislative veto was unconstitutional.
receive adjustment assistance under chapter 2 or benefits from other man-
power programs;
(2) information and advice from the Secretary of Commerce on the ex-
tent to which firms in the industry have applied for, are receiving, or are
likely to receive adjustment assistance under chapters 3 and 4;
(3) the probable effectiveness of import relief as a means to promote
adjustment, the efforts being made or to be implemented by the industry
concerned to adjust to import competition, and other considerations relative
to the position of the industry in the nation's economy;
(4) the effect of import relief on consumers (including the price and
availability of the imported article and the like or directly competitive articles
produced in the United States) and on competition in the domestic markets
for such articles;
(5) the effect of import relief on the international economic interests of
the United States;
(6) the impact on the United States industries and firms as a conse-
quence of any possible modification of duties or other import restrictions
which may result from international obligations with respect to compensa-
tion;
(7) the geographic concentration of imported products marketed in the
United States;
(8) the extent to which the United States market is the focal point for
exports of such article by reason of restraints on exports of such article to, or
on imports of such article into, third country markets; and
(9) the economic and social costs which would be incurred by taxpayers,
communities, and workers, if import relief were or were not provided.
15 While the scheme of sections 201-203 gives the President great discretion, the
original Senate Finance Committee version of the 1974 Act would have required the Presi-
dent to provide import relief or adjustment assistance if recommended by the Commis-
sion. The Committee's report stated:
This section would require the President to implement import relief or, if the
Commission finds that adjustment assistance offers a viable alternative to im-
port relief, to direct that expeditious consideration be given petitions for ad-
justment assistance. That relief ought not to be denied for reasons that have
nothing whatever to do with the merits of the case as determined under U.S.
law. In particular, the Committee feels that no U.S. industry which has suf-
fered serious injury should be cut off from relief for foreign policy reasons.
S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 6, at 24. There is a substantial similarity in the concept
approved by the Senate Finance Committee in 1974 and that considered by the committee
in 1986, as will be discussed infra.
16 As amended by the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948,
2998 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (c)(l) (Supp. III 1985)).
17 Id.
18 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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In Chadha, the veto could not be used to allow the House or the Sen-
ate to override a decision by the executive branch to allow a deport-
able alien to remain in the United States.' 9 The Court determined
that a valid law must be passed by the House and Senate (bicam-
eralism) and then presented to and approved by the President (pre-
sentment).20 While the legislative veto provided for in section
203(c)(1) did not violate the bicameralism requirement, the Court
decided it was inconsistent with presentment requirements. There-
fore, the procedure for Congress to override the President's escape
clause decisions was invalid. Since the legislative veto provisions in
section 203(c)(1) were considered severable from the remainder of
Title II, the lack of a valid legal basis for a congressional override did
not invalidate the escape clause itself.
Recognizing the impact of Chadha, 21 Congress amended section
203 in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984. The amended section 203
provides for a congressional veto of the President's decision to pro-
vide no relief, or relief different from that recommended by the
Commission, through the enactment by the House and Senate of a
joint resolution within ninety days. 22
II. Section 201 Injury Determinations: 1981-1986
Since President Reagan took office, the Commission has made
decisions regarding sixteen section 201 cases. The Commission
found no injury in ten of those cases.23 Of the remaining six cases
where the Commission found injury and recommended import re-
lief, the President granted such relief or alternative relief in four:
19 That particular legislative veto was contained in § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration
and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982).
20 462 U.S. at 951.
21 Chadha struck "down in one fell swoop provisions in more laws enacted by Con-
gress than the [Supreme] Court has cumulatively invalidated in its history." 462 U.S. 919,
1002 (1983) (WhiteJ., dissenting). The 1974 Act alone contained six legislative vetoes in
addition to section 203(c)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). See also 19 U.S.C. §§ 2193, 2412(b),
1303(e)(2), 2432(d), 2435(c) (Supp. III 1985). See generally Koh, Congressional Controls on
Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U.J. INr'L L. & POL. 1191
(1986).
22 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (Supp. III 1985). H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
142-43 (1984), explains that the purpose of the amendment was to conform current proce-
dures to the Chadha ruling by substituting joint for concurrent resolutions. As a result, the
President can veto any joint resolution disapproving the President's determination.
23 Fishing Rods and Parts Thereof, USITC Pub. 1194, Inv. No. TA-201-45 (Nov.
1981) [hereinafter Fishing Rods]; Tubeless Tire Valves, USITC Pub. 1286, Inv. No. TA-
201-46 (Sept. 1982); Stainless Steel Flatware, USITC Pub. 1536, Inv. No. TA-201-49 (june
1984); Nonrubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1545, Inv. No. TA-201-50 (July 1984) [hereinaf-
ter Footwear III]; Certain Canned Tuna Fish, USITC Pub. 1558, Inv. No. TA-201-53 (Aug.
1984); Potassium Permanganate, USITC Pub. 1682, Inv. No. TA-201-54 (Apr. 1985); Elec-
tric Shavers and Parts Thereof, USITC 1819, Inv. No.TA-201-57 (Mar. 1986) [hereinafter
Electric Shavers]; Certain Metal Castings, USITC Pub. 1849, Inv. No. TA-201-58 (June
1986); AppleJuice, USITC Pub. 1861, Inv. No. TA-201-59 (June 1986); Steel Fork Arms,
USITC Pub. 1866, Inv. No. TA-201-60 (July 1986).
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heavyweight motorcycles 2 4 stainless steel and alloy tool steel, 25 car-
bon steel 2 6 and wood shakes and shingles.2 7 In only two of the
cases where the Commission found injury did the President deny im-
port relief: copper 28 and footwear.29 This record is hardly that of an
Administration that has blue-penciled section 201 out of the statute
books30
24 Heavyweight Motorcycles and Engine and Power Train Subassemblies Therefor,
USITC Pub. 1342, Inv. No. TA-201-47 (Feb. 1983); Temporary Duty Increase and Tariff-
Rate Quota on the Importation into the United States of Certain Heavyweight
Motorcycles, 48 Fed. Reg. 16,639 (Apr. 15, 1983).
25 Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, USITC Pub. 1377, Inv. No. TA-201-48 (May
1983); Specialty Steel Import Relief Determination, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,177, 33,233 (1983).
26 Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products, USITC Pub. 1553, Inv. No. TA-201-51
(July 1984); Steel Import Relief Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 36,813 (1984).
27 Wood Shakes and Shingles, USITC Pub. 1826, Inv. No. TA-201-56 (Mar. 1986);
Memorandum of May 23, 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,157 (1986).
28 Unwrought Copper, USITC Pub. 1549, Inv. No. TA-201-52 (July 1984) [hereinaf-
ter Unwrought Copper]; Copper Import Relief Determination, 49 Fed. Reg. 35,609
(1984).
29 Nonrubber Footwear, USITC Pub. 1717, Inv. No. TA-201-55 (July 1985) [her-
inafter Footwear IV]; Memorandum of Aug. 28, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,205 (1985).
30 During the Carter Administration, 33 cases were filed under section 201. In 13 of
those cases, the ITC found no injury. Round Stainless Steel Wire, USITC Pub. 779, Inv.
No. TA-201-13 (June 1976); Plant Hangers, USITC Pub. 797, Inv. No. TA-201-15 (Dec.
1976); Low-Carbon Ferrochromium, USITC Pub. 825, Inv. No. TA-201-20 (July 1977);
Cast Iron Cooking Ware, USITC Pub. 817, Inv. No. TA-201-21 (May 1977); Fresh Cut
Flowers, USITC Pub. 827, Inv. No. TA-201-22 (Aug. 1977); Certain Headware, USITC
Pub. 829, Inv. No. TA-201-23 (Aug. 1977); Live Cattle and Certain Edible Meat Products
of Cattle, USITC Pub. 834, Inv. No. TA-201-25 (Sept. 1977); Malleable Cast Iron Pipe and
Tube Fittings, USITC Pub. 835, Inv. No. TA-201-26 (Sept. 1977); Unalloyed Unwrought
Zinc, USITC Pub. 894, Inv. No. TA-201-31 (June 1978); Certain Machine Needles, USITC
Pub. 936, Inv. No. TA-201-38 (Feb. 1979); Certain Fish, USITC Pub. 1028, Inv. No. TA-
201-41 (Jan. 1980); Fresh Cut Roses, USITC Pub. 1059, Inv. No. TA-201-42 (Apr. 1980);
Automobiles, USITC Pub. 1110, Inv. No. TA-201-44 (Dec. 1980).
Of the remaining 20 cases, the President provided import relief in 10 of them.
Shrimp, USITC Pub. 773, Inv. No. TA-201-12 (May 1976); Letter ofJuly 1, 1978, 41 Fed.
Reg. 27,709 (1978) (import relief granted by President Ford); Sugar, USITC Pub. 807,
Inv. No. TA-201-16 (1977); Proclamation No. 4538, 42 Fed. Reg. 59,037 (1977); Procla-
mation No. 4539, 42 Fed. Reg. 59,039 (1977); Footwear, USITC Pub. 799, Inv. No. TA-
201-18 (Feb. 1977); Proclamation No. 4510, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 908 (June 27,
1977); Television Receivers, Color or Monochrome, Assembled or Not Assembled, Fin-
ished or Not Finished and Subassemblies Thereof, USITC Pub. 808, Inv. No. TA-201-19
(Feb. 1977) [hereinafter Footwear II]; Proclamation No. 4511, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 914 (June 27, 1977); Citizens Band (CB) Transceivers, USITC Pub. 852, Inv. No.
TA-201-29 (Feb. 1978); Memorandum of March 27, 1978, 43 Fed.Reg. 12,843, 15,127
(1978); High-Carbon Ferrochrome, USITC Pub. 911, Inv. No. TA-201-35 (Sept. 1978);
Proclamation No. 4608, 43 Fed. Reg. 4245 (1978); Clothespins, USITC Pub. 933, Inv. No.
TA-201-36 (Dec. 1978); Memorandum of Oct. 2, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 45,547 (1979); Bolts,
Nuts, and Large Screws, USITC Pub. 924, Inv. No. TA-201-37 (Nov. 1978); Proclamation
No. 4632, 44 Fed. Reg. 1697 (1979); Non-Electric Cookware, USITC Pub. 1008, Inv. No.
TA-201-39 (Nov. 1979); Memorandum of Jan. 2, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 759 (1980); Mush-
rooms, USITC Pub. 1089, Inv. No. TA-201-43 (Aug. 1980); Proclamation No. 4801, 45
Fed. Reg. 72,617 (1980).
The Executive provided no relief in the rest. Honey, USITC Pub. 781, Inv. No. TA-
201-14 (June 1976); Memorandum of Aug. 28, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 36,787 (1976); Mush-
rooms, USITC Pub. 708, Inv. No. TA-201-17 (Jan. 1977); Memorandum of March 10,
1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 13,801 (1977); Cast Iron Stoves, USITC Pub. 826, Inv. No. TA-201-24
(July 1977); Memorandum of Sept. 20, 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 55,081 (1978); Bolts, Nuts, and
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A. International Trade Commission Injury Determinations
In determining whether increased imports are "a substantial
cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic indus-
try," 3' the Commission uses a five-part analysis:
(1) which domestic industry is affected?
(2) are imports increasing?
(3) is the domestic industry seriously injured?
(4) if not seriously injured, is the domestic injury threatened
with serious injury?
(5) are increased imports a "substantial cause" of the injury?
Each of these parts will be discussed below.
1. Domestic Industy
First, the Commission must define "the domestic industry pro-
ducing an article like or directly competitive with an imported arti-
cle." 32 The House Ways and Means Committee Report defines
"like" articles as "those which are substantially identical in inherent
or intrinsic characteristics (i.e., materials from which made, appear-
ance, quality, texture, and etc.) .... "33 "Directly competitive" arti-
cles, on the other hand, "are those which, although not substantially
identical in their inherent or intrinsic characteristics, are substan-
tially equivalent for commercial purposes, that is, are adapted to the
same uses and are essentially interchangeable therefor."3 4 Both pro-
ducers of a like product and a directly competitive product can be
considered part of a domestic industry under section 201. The Coin-
Large Screws, USITC Pub. 847, Inv. No. TA-201-27 (Dec. 1977); Memorandum of Feb.
10, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 6575 (1978); High-Carbon Ferrochrome, USITC Pub. 845, Inv.
No. TA-201-28 (Dec. 1977); Memorandum of Jan. 27, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 4245 (1978);
Stainless Steel Flatware, USITC Pub. 884, Inv. No. TA-201-30 (May 1978); Memorandum
ofJune 30, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 29,259 (1978); Unalloyed Unwrought Copper, USITC Pub.
905, Inv. No. TA-201-32 (Aug. 1978); Presidential Memorandum of Oct. 24, 1978,43 Fed.
Reg. 49,523 (1978); Bicycle Tires and Tubes, USITC Pub. 910, Inv. No. TA-201-33 (Sept.
1978); Memorandum of Oct. 30, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 50,995 (1978); Fishing Tackle, USITC
Pub. 917, Inv. No. TA-201-34 (Sept. 1978); Memorandum of Nov. 22, 1978, 43 Fed. Reg.
55,233 (1978); Leather Wearing Apparel, USITC Pub. 1030, Inv. No. TA-201-40 (Jan.
1980); Memorandum of March 24, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 19,543 (1980).
31 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
32 In defining the domestic industry concerned, 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(3) (1982 &
Supp. III 1985), authorizes the Commission to disregard any imports of like or directly
competitive articles by a domestic producer. Where a domestic producer makes more than
one article, it further authorizes the Commission to treat as part of the domestic industry
only that portion or subdivision of the producer which makes the like or directly competi-
tive article. Finally, where U.S. production concentrated in a major geographic area consti-
tutes a substantial portion of the U.S. domestic industry and primarily serves that market,
it authorizes the Commission to treat as the domestic industry only producers located in
such area.
33 H.R. REP. No. 571, supra note 7, at 45. Identical language is contained in the Sen-
ate Finance Committee's report. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 6, at 121-22.
34 Id. S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 6, at 122.
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mission attempts to define like or directly competitive in a manner
that reflects the realities of the market.
In addition to addressing which domestic article or articles are
"like or directly competitive with the imported articles," the Com-
mission also considers "what domestic facilities . . . produc[e] the
like or directly competitive article." 3 5 The Commission will consider
the machines and plants that produce the domestic articles, as well as
the workers employed in those facilities. Legislative history directs
the Commission to consider "the question of serious injury to the
productive resources (e.g., employees, physical facilities, and capital)
employed in the divisions or plants in which the article in question is
produced.''36
In applying the statute, the Commission had traditionally con-
sidered: (1) production facilities and processes, including the own-
ership of plant and equipment (e.g., what articles domestic producers
make and whether they are made in the same or separate facilities);
(2) marketing practices (e.g., whether the marketing channels are the
same or substantially different); (3) interchangeability of the prod-
ucts; (4) the nature of the products in appearance, size, and shape;
and (5) the requests of the domestic producers (e.g., what facilities
are alleged to be injured).
In applying these factors to the 1981-1986 period, the Commis-
sion found it inappropriate in several steel or metal cases to find a
single applicable domestic industry. In Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool
Steel,37 the Commission found four separate industries producing al-
loy tool steel, stainless steel bar and wire rod, stainless steel plate,
and stainless steel sheet and strip. While the Commission recog-
nized that all stainless steel products are interrelated and share cer-
tain basic physical properties, it found that the products were made
by different industries since the products varied in appearance, size,
and shape, and were generally produced on different machinery and
in different facilities.38 The Commission reached similar decisions in
Certain Metal Castings (eleven industries)3 9 and Carbon and Certain Alloy
Steel Products (nine industries). 40
In other cases, however, the Commission has focused on
"whether products are essentially interchangeable in the sense of be-
ing substantially equivalent for commercial purposes." 4' On this ba-
35 See, e.g., Certain Canned Tuna Fish, supra note 23, at 6.
36 H.R. REP. No. 571, supra note 7, at 46.
37 Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, supra note 25, at 16.
38 Id. at 11-15
s9 Certain Metal Castings, supra note 23, at 4-9.
40 Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products, supra note 26, at 12-23.
41 Wood Shakes and Shingles, supra note 27, at 3-7 (where the Commission found
one industry on the basis that the various shakes and shingles were, "to a greater or lesser
extent, interchangeable"); Footwear IV, supra note 29, at 59 (opinion of Comm'r Eckes)
(where the Commissioners considered whether to find two separate industries, one ori-
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sis, it found a single domestic industry.
2. Increased Imports
The Commission next considers whether the imported articles
are being imported in "increased quantities."'42 Normal Commission
practice is to consider the most recent five-year period as the rele-
vant period for determining whether imports have increased.43 Use
of the five-year period is not mandatory, however, and the Commis-
sion may adopt shorter or longer periods where special circum-
stances warrant. 44
The Commission has taken the view that an increase in imports,
either in absolute quantities or relative to domestic production, satis-
fies the requirement for increased imports.45 Thus, in Carbon and
Certain Alloy Steel Products,46 the Commission found imports to have
increased for plates, railway-type products, bars, structural shapes
and units, and pipes and tubes, even though, in absolute terms, im-
ports had declined. In light of the changing membership of the
Commission, and the fact that Vice Chairman Brunsdale has not
taken a position, this issue bears continued close scrutiny.
3. Serious Injury
The Commission next considers whether the domestic industry
is seriously injured. 47 According to the Commission, serious injury
requires "'an important, crippling, or mortal injury, one having per-
manent or lasting consequences.' "48 Chairman Liebeler views this
definition as equivalent with a "'major contraction of a domestic in-
dustry or its extinction.' -49
ented to nonathletic footwear and the other to athletic footwear; instead, they found a
single domestic industry, rejecting the argument that "directly competitive" means "two-
way substitution);" and Certain Canned Tuna Fish, supra note 23, at 4-7 (where the Com-
mission found that the domestic industry was canned tuna, whether packed in oil, water or
any other medium). But see Electric Shavers, supra note 23, at 4-7 (where the Commission
found that "electric shavers are not substantially equivalent for commercial purposes").
42 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
43 Birch Plywood Doorskins, USITC Pub. 732, Inv. No. TA-201-1, at 12-19 (Oct.
1975) (views of Comm'r Leonard).
44 See, e.g., Stainless Steel Table Flatware, supra note 23, at 9-10, where the Commis-
sion used a six-year period because it "capture[d] the most recent business cycle."
45 This position is reflected in virtually all the Commission determinations made in
the 1981-1986 time period. The most thorough defense of this position is presented in
Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products, supra note 26, at 24-28. Cf § 406 of the 1974
Act, supra note 8, which expressly authorizes the President to provide relief if, inter alia,
imports are increasing "absolutely or relatively."
46 See supra note 26, at 28-34.
47 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
48 Electric Shavers, supra note 23, at 8; Certain Metal Castings, supra note 23, at 11.
49 Steel Fork Arms, supra note 23, at 24. In Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products,
supra note 26, at 134-36, Chairman Liebeler describes her approach to serious injury:
It is my opinion that it is appropriate to consider injury to the viability of the
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In making this determination regarding serious injury, the Com-
mission takes into account the following factors under the statute.
First, the Commission must consider the significant idling of produc-
tive facilities in the industry.50 Cases applying this criterion include
an analysis of such factors as plant closings, new entrants, U.S. pro-
duction and shipments, capacity, and capacity utilization. The "sig-
nificance of this idling" of production facilities can be "diminished
by [an] increase in capacity and the structural shift in the domestic
industry to lower volume, higher value" products. 51
A second relevant factor is "the inability of a significant number
of firms to operate at a reasonable level of profit."'52 The Commis-
sion has emphasized the importance of industry profitability53 and
normally has applied this test by looking at the firm's actual profits
and ratio of net profits to net sales.
Third, the Commission must take into account "significant un-
employment or underemployment within the industry." 54 This fac-
tor also involves a relatively straightforward analysis of employment
of production and production-related workers, hours worked, wages,
and total compensation. Not all of these factors will necessarily be
moving in the same direction at the same time.
The presence or absence of any one of these factors is not dis-
positive of the injury question.55
4. Threat of Serious Injury
In determining whether there is a threat of serious injury, the
Commission must consider, among other economic factors, the fol-
lowing: "a decline in sales, a higher and growing inventory ... and a
industry, rather than injury to the economic well-being of those who provide
the factors of production to the industry, i.e., labor and capital.
In order to illustrate the difference, I will restate my example of two
hypothetical industries, A and B. Assume that: labor and capital in Industry
A can readily be moved to other uses without significant losses; labor and
capital in Industry B cannot readily be moved to other uses; and rates of
return in each industry are at competitive levels....
These two extreme examples illustrate the difference in the meaning of
injury to a domestic industry. In the first case, Industry A is so severely af-
fected that it disappears, but the workers and suppliers of capital are not
adversely affected. In the second case, Industry B continues to produce, but
the suppliers of the capital and labor are severely injured. I believe that the
correct construction of the statute requires that Industry A but not Industry
B be eligible for import relief under section 201.
50 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Trade and Tariff Act of
1984 defined "significant idling of productive facilities" to include "the closing of plants
or the underutilization of production capacity." 19 U.S.C § 2251(b)(7) (Supp. III 1985).
51 Stainless Steel Table Flatware, supra note 23, at 11.
52 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
53 See, e.g., Stainless Steel Table Flatware, supra note 23, at 13.
54 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
55 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(D) (Supp. III 1985). This provision was added as an
amendment to § 201 in the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.
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downward trend in production, profits, wages, or employment (or
increasing underemployment) in the domestic industry con-
cerned." 56 The Senate Finance Committee report defined threat of
serious injury to exist "when serious injury, although not yet ex-
isting, is clearly imminent if import trends continued unabated." 57
The Commission has traditionally required that the threat be
"real rather than speculative" and that "serious injury be highly
probable in the foreseeable future."58 While the threat of injury
analysis focuses on future events, "the fundamental statutory tests of
injury and causation are no less rigorous."' 59 In addition to the items
specifically noted by Congress, 60 the Commission has considered
such other factors as: high inventories maintained by importers and
dealers, 61 excess capacity in the exporting country, 62 the lack of a
domestic market for the product in the exporting country, 65 a sud-
den increase in imports or a strong upward trend in imports,64 and a
downward trend in the prices of imports. 65
5. Substantial Cause
Finally, the Commission determines whether increased imports
are a substantial cause of the serious injury or threat of serious injury
56 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1985).
57 S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 6, at 121. According to the Committee Report:
With respect to threat of serious injury, the commission should consider a
decline in sales, a higher and growing inventory, and downward trend in pro-
duction, profits, wages, or employment (or increasing underemployment) in
the affected domestic industry. The existence of any of these factors such as
the growth in inventory would not in itself be relevant to the threat of injury
from imports if it resulted from conditions unrelated to imports. Such condi-
tions could arise from a variety of other causes, such as changes in technol-
ogy or in consumer tastes, domestic competition from substitute products,
plant obsolescence, or poor management. It is the intention of the Commit-
tee that the threat of serious injury exists when serious injury, although not
yet existing, is clearly imminent if import trends continued unabated.
Id.
58 Footwear III, supra note 23, at 19; Certain Metal Castings, supra note 23, at 11.
59 Heavyweight Motorcycles and Engines and Power Train Substitutes Therefor,
USITC Pub. 1342, Inv. No. TA-201-47, at 70 (Feb. 1983) [hereinafter Heavyweight
Motorcycles].
60 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
61 Heavyweight Motorcyles, supra note 59, at 13 (views of Chairman Eckes):
The primary factor underlying the threat of injury to this industry consists of
importers' and dealers' inventories. Importers' inventories have tripled since
1979, and most recently doubled in the first nine months of 1982 over the
same period in 1981.
62 See, e.g., Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, supra note 25, at 11 (views of
Comm'rs Moore and Bedell).
63 Heavyweight Motorcycles, supra note 59, at 14 (views of Chairman Eckes):
Because motorcycles of more than 750cc, which include the merchandise
under investigation here, cannot be sold in Japan under current law, Japa-
nese producers cannot consider domestic sales as a replacement for
exports....
64 Mushrooms, supra note 30, at 12.
65 Honey, supra note 30, at 12,
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to the domestic industry.6 6 The "substantial cause" determination
"lies at the heart of the statutory framework and is the single most
important feature of most Section 201 investigations. ' 67
The term "substantial cause" is defined as "a cause which is im-
portant and not less than any other cause." 6 8 Thus, as a part of its
analysis, the Commission must: (1) identify other potential causes of
serious injury, (2) determine whether increased imports are an im-
portant cause of serious injury, and (3) decide whether any other
cause has a more important effect on the condition of the domestic
industry than increased imports. 69 The statute directs the Commis-
sion, in determining substantial cause, to take into account all eco-
nomic factors it considers relevant, including "an increase in imports
(either actual or relative to domestic production) and a decline in the
proportion of the domestic market supplied by domestic
producers. "70
In making its determinations, the Commission applies more
than just a mathematical test. It weighs causes wherever possible, in
order to decide whether imports are one of a multitude of equal
causes or threats of injury, or rather a substantial cause or threat of
injury.71
One of the keys to this analysis involves determining what is a
separate cause of injury. If the Commission subdivides the various
causes narrowly, it is far more likely to find substantial causation.
In Unwrought Copper,7 2 Vice Chairman Liebeler cautioned against
66 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Senate Finance Committee
report accompanying the Trade Reform Act of 1974 described the earlier standard and the
reason for change:
The requirement of the Trade Expansion Act that increased imports result in
major part from trade concessions has been very difficult to satisfy in the past
and has become a major barrier to import relief. The criteria for import re-
lief under the bill would relax the present import relief criteria by: (1) re-
moving the "causal link" requirement that imports result in major part from
trade agreement concessions and (2) requiring that increased imports need
only be a "substantial cause", rather than "the major cause", of actual or
threatened injury. The increase in imports referred to would generally be
such increases as have occurred since the effectiveness of the most recent
trade agreement concessions proclaimed by the President, i.e. as of now, the
effectiveness of the Kennedy Round concessions beginning in 1968. Modifi-
cation of the requirement that increased imports be the major cause of actual
or threatened injury is necessary because "the major cause" has been inter-
preted as being a cause greater than all other causes combined (although
there is some indication that in recent years the Commission has moved away
from this standard). This has proved in many cases to be an unreasonably
difficult standard to meet.
S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 6, at 120.
67 Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products, supra note 26, at 89 (views of Chairwo-
man Stern).
68 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(4) (1982 Supp. III 1985).
69 S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 6, at 120.
70 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1985).
71 S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 6, at 120-21.
72 See supra note 28. Vice Chairman Liebeler followed a similar analysis in Wood
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"compar[ing] a genus with a species or subspecies. It is important
that one compare increases in imports with concepts of the same
level of generality."173 She maintained there are only three types of
causes of injury or the threat of injury at the appropriate level of
generality: "(1) decline in demand; (2) decline in domestic supply;
and (3) an increase in foreign supply." 74
In making its causation determinations, the Commission has
looked at various criteria: cyclical changes resulting from economic
recession, 75 low levels of imports, 76 small increases in imports, 77 de-
clines in export shipments, 78 increased domestic competition, 79 shift
in market preferences,80 declining raw material supply, 8 ' increase in
Shakes and Shingles, supra note 27, at 53-73. She was joined in that opinion by Commis-
sioner Brunsdale.
73 Unwrought Copper, USITC Pub. 1549, Inv. No. TA-201-52, at 60 (July 1984). In
Electric Shavers, supra note 23, at 13-16, Commissioner Rohr stated his view that that
investigation illustrates the limitations in analyzing causation in terms of supply and
demand.
74 Unwrought Copper, supra note 73, at 60.
75 Unwrought Copper, supra note 73, at 12-13. In Heavyweight Motorcycles, supra
note 59, at 14-15, Chairman Eckes said:
In reaching this conclusion I have considered the significance of the present
recession in my analysis. Without a doubt the unusual length and severity of
the present recession has created unique problems for the domestic motorcy-
cle industry. Without a doubt the rise in joblessness, particularly among
blue-collar workers, who constitute the prime market for heavyweight
motorcycles, has had a severe impact on the domestic industry. Nonetheless,
if the Commission were to analyze the causation question in this way, it
would be impossible in many cases for a cyclical industry experiencing seri-
ous injury to obtain relief under section 201 during a recession. In my opin-
ion Congress could not have intended for the Commission to interpret the
law this way.
In Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, supra note 25, at 65, Commissioner Stern (who
dissented in Heavyweight Motorcycles, supra note 59) stated:
Some have oversimplified the choice facing the Commission when it analyzes
cyclical industries during recessions. One extreme would treat all recession-
related effects as a single cause to be weighed against imports; the other
would eliminate recession as a possible alternative cause. The law is silent on
a direct resolution to this issue, whether heavily cyclical or not, be on an
equal footing when applying for section 201 relief. To count blindly all reces-
sion-related effects as one single cause weighed against imports could effec-
tively thwart cyclical industries, like steel, from getting relief when they may
need it most. On the other hand, eliminating from consideration all reces-
sion-related effects could give highly cyclical industries special advantages in
obtaining relief during a downturn. Fortunately, there is a path between the
two extremes: considering only the unusual or abnormal effects on an indus-
try in a downturn as causes of injury. This gives any kind of industry equal
access to import relief, and I have consistently applied this approach (empha-
sis in original).
76 Certain Metal Castings, supra note 23.
77 Tubeless Tire Valves, supra note 23, at 9; Fishing Rods, supra note 23, at 11-12.
78 Potassium Permanganate, supra note 23, at II n.40 (views of Chairwoman Stern);
Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, supra note 25, at 36 (views of Comm'r Stern).
79 Tubeless Tire Valves, supra note 23, at 9-11; Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Prod-
ucts, supra note 26, at 49; and Heavyweight Motorcycles, supra note 59, at 66, 69-70 (views
of Comm'r Stern).
1 80 Wood Shakes and Shingles, supra note 27, at 17 ("increased concern for safety and
fire retardent considerations and the availability of substitute roofing and siding materials
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prices of input product,8 2 decline in demand,83 noncompetitive cost
structure of U.S. producers,8 4 "loss of the domestic industry's major
customer,"85 U.S. Government actionsa 6 and labor contracts.8 7
III. Section 201 Remedy Recommendations and Presidential
Decisions: 1981-1986
If it makes an affirmative injury determination, the Commission
is required to:
(A) find the amount of increase in, or imposition of, any duty or
import restriction on such article which is necessary to prevent or
remedy such injury, or
(B) if it determines that adjustment assistance under subchap-
ters 2, 3, and 4 can effectively remedy such injury, recommend the
provision of such assistance.88
The purpose of the statute is to provide "temporary relief... so
that the industry will have sufficient time to adjust to the freer inter-
national competition." 8 9
The President is authorized to provide the following forms of
relief:
(1) increased duties, which have been provided seven times out
of the sixty section 201 cases filed thus far;90
(2) tariff-rate quotas, i.e., increased duties above a certain level
at competitive prices"); Certain Canned Tuna Fish, supra note 23, at 16 ("shift in con-
sumer preferences to tuna packed in water"); Fishing Rods, supra note 23, at 12 ("shift in
demand from rods of tubular construction to less expensive solid rods").
81 Wood Shakes and Shingles, supra note 27, at 14-16 ("declining supply and harvest
of western red cedar suitable for the production of shakes and shingles").
82 Certain Canned Tuna Fish, supra note 23, at 16 ("large increase in raw fish prices
between 1979 and 1981").
83 Unwrought Copper, supra note 73, at 11-12 (views of Comm'rs Eckes, Lodwick,
and Rohr) and 30, 36-38 (views of Chairwoman Stern); Certain Metal Castings, supra note
23, at 41; Tubeless Tire Valves, supra note 23, at 9-11; Heavyweight Motorcycles, supra
note 59, at 66-69 (views of Comm'r Stern); Carbon and Certain Steel Alloy Products, supra
note 26, at 47-49, 65, 93-97; Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, supra note 25, at 36-37
(views of Comm'r Stern on stainless steel plate).
84 Unwrought Copper, supra note 73, at 30-36; Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Prod-
ucts, supra note 26, at 85.
85 Potassium Permanganate, supra note 23, at 11-14.
86 Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products, supra note 26, at 48-49 (government reg-
ulations-views of Chairwoman Stern and Comm'rs Eckes, Lodwick and Rohr). See also id.
at 90 (government action affecting environmental costs and the tax system-additional
views of Chairwoman Stern).
87 Unwrought Copper, supra note 73, at 12-13.
88 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
89 S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 6, at 119.
90 Memorandum of March 27, 1978, supra note 30; Proclamation No. 4608, supra note
30; Proclamation No. 4632, supra note 30; Memorandum of Jan. 2, 1980, supra note 30;
Mushrooms, supra note 30; Temporary Duty Increase on Heavyweight Motorcycles, supra
note 24; Specialty Steel Import Relief Determination, supra note 25 (see infra note 121);
Memorandum of May 23, 1986, supra note 27.
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of imports, provided once;9'
(3) quotas, provided four times;9 2
(4) negotiated orderly market agreements, i.e., where a foreign
government or governments negotiate an agreed limit on ex-
ports to the United States, provided three times;93
(5) adjustment assistance, where financial assistance is provided
to firms and/or workers to assist them to adjust to import com-
petition, provided six times; 94 or
(6) any combination of the above actions, provided twice.95
There are certain restrictions on the manner in which the President
can implement import relief.96
A. Motorcycles
1. Commission Recommendation
In Heavyweight Motorcycles,97 the Commission 98 found that in-
creased imports of heavyweight motorcycles were a substantial cause
of the threat of serious injury to the domestic industry. The Com-
mission99 recommended that, in addition to the then-existing duty
rate of 4.4%, an incremental duty be imposed for five years' 00 at the
91 Temporary Duty Increase on Heavyweight Motorcycles, supra note 24.
92 Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, USITC Pub. 756, Inv. No. TA-201-5 (Jan.
1976), 41 Fed. Reg. 4,269 (1976); Clothespins, supra note 30; and Stainless Steel and Alloy
Tool Steel, supra note 25.
93 Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, supra note 92; Footwear II, supra note 30.
94 Slide Fasteners, USITC Pub. 757, Inv. No. TA-201-6 (Feb. 1976); Footwear,
USITC Pub. 758, Inv. No. TA-201-7 (Feb. 1976); Memorandum of April 16, 1976, 41 Fed.
Reg. 16,545 (1976) [hereinafter Footwear I]; Stainless Steel Flatwear, supra note 23; Mush-
rooms, supra note 30; Shrimp, supra note 30; Footwear IV, supra note 29.
95 Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, supra note 92 (orderly marketing agreements
and quotas); see, e.g., Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, supra note 25 (quotas and tariff
increases).
96 For example, any duty increase cannot result in a duty "which is more than 50
percent ad valorem above the rate (if any) existing at the time of the proclamation" (19
U.S.C. § 2253(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); initial relief can be for no more than five
years (19 U.S.C. § 2253(h)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); initial relief can be extended once
for not more than three years, but may not be made more restrictive (19 U.S.C.
§ 2253(h)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)): any quantitative restriction or orderly marketing
agreement must permit imports of the article not less than the quantity or value of such
article imported into the United States during the most recent representative period (19
U.S.C. § 2253(d)(2) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)); any relief must be phased down after three
years "to the extent feasible" (19 U.S.C. § 2253(h)(2) (1982 & Supp. I 1985)).
97 Heavyweight Motorcycles, supra note 59.
98 Chairman Eckes and Commissioner Haggart found a threat of injury; Commis-
sioner Stern dissented. Id. at 1.
99 While Chairman Eckes and Commissioner Haggart presented separate views on
injury and remedy, their recommendations on remedy were identical. Commissioner
Stern found no injury or threat and recommended no relief. Id. at 16-19 (remedy views of
Chairman Eckes), 47-54 (remedy views of Comm'r Haggart), and 79-83 (remedy views of
Comm'r Stern).
100 Commissioner Haggart noted that five-year relief periods have been recommended
in the past in cases where a large inventory of imported merchandise posed a threat of
serious injury to the domestic industry. CB Radio Transceivers, supra note 30.
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declining rates of 45, 35, 20, 15, and 10% ad valorem.' 0' Chairman
Eckes noted two reasons for providing this relief: the need to dis-
courage further imports while the large inventory was liquidated;
and the need to enable Harley-Davidson, the sole U.S. producer of
heavyweight motorcycles not affiliated with a Japanese parent com-
pany, to modernize plants and equipment and improve its product
lines. 102
2. Presidential Decision
The President followed the Commission's recommendation, ex-
cept for its five-year tariff rate quotas.10 3 The additional duties ap-
plied only to imports above the quota level specified.
Arguments within the Administration in favor of section 201 re-
lief included a desire to save Harley-Davidson from bankruptcy,
which would result in job losses for 2,500 Harley employees and 500
employees of Harley suppliers.' 0 4 Another argument for providing
relief was that denial of relief could have encouraged congressional
efforts to limit Presidential discretion in section 201.
Arguments against relief under section 201 focused on the sig-
nificant price increases for heavy motorcycles, estimated to be ini-
tially 10% to 17%.105 Opponents also stressed the resulting
vulnerability of the United States to claims for compensation or re-
taliation, and threat to the credibility of the Administration's free
trade policies.
Virtually all sides agree that Heavyweight Motorcycles represented
a successful use of section 201 to enable an industry to adjust to im-
port competition. Harley-Davidson implemented most of its original
adjustment plan, including statistical quality controls and just-in-
101 Commissioner Haggart noted that section 203(d)(2) limits quotas to a level that is
not less than the quantity imported into the United States in the most recent representa-
tive period (19 U.S.C. § 2253(d)(2) (Supp. III 1985)); she concluded that it would not be
possible to impose "a quota low enough to have a sufficient impact on the current over-
supply of motorcycles." Heavyweight Motorcycles, supra note 59, at 48.
102 Heavyweight Motorcycles, supra note 59, at 17-18. Commissoner Stern opposed
this remedy recommendation, based on her belief that: (1) "the length of relief is dispro-
portionate to the short-lived nature of any threat," (2) the relief will provide a windfall to
the healthy segments of the domestic industry while doing little to benefit Harley-David-
son, and (3) "the relief will unduly penalize BMW and other minor importers." Id. at 79-
83.
103 The tariff-rate quotas were 5,000 units (increasing yearly to 6,000, 7,000, 8,500,
and 10,000) for imports from the Federal Republic of Germany, 6,000 units (increasing
1,000 yearly) for imports for all other countries. 48 Fed. Reg. 16,639, 16,641 (1983).
The tariff-rate quotas were established to maintain an open U.S. market for small vol-
ume producers that pose no threat of injury to the U.S. industry. Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, President Takes 201 Action on Motorcycle Imports (April 1, 1983).
104 There was a general belief within the Administration that the Harley-Davidson ad-
justment plan was realistic and that the import relief recommended by the Commission
would permit sufficient adjustment that the industry would be able to meet import compe-
tition at the end of the relief period.
105 Cost to consumers in the first year was estimated to be $75 to $100 million.
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time inventory controls that resulted in substantial increases in pro-
ductivity and competitiveness. 10 6 In fact, in 1987 Harley-Davidson
unprecedentedly requested that relief be terminated early, and the
President complied. 10 7
B. Specialty Steel
1. Commission Recommendation
In Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel,10 8 the Commission found that
increased imports were a substantial cause of serious injury to the
stainless steel sheet and strip, stainless steel plate, stainless steel bar
and rod, and alloy tool steel industries.' 0 9 Commissioners Stern and
Haggart proposed that the President impose quantitative restrictions
based on market shares"I0 for a period of three years,' 11 as follows:
Stainless Steel 12
Calendar Sheet & Alloy Tool
Year Strip Plate Bar Rod Steel
1983-85 An amount for each calendar year equivalent to the following
percentages of forecasted apparent U.S. consumption for that
year, but not less than the quantities specified.
8% 10% 17% 42% 20%
In short
tons 62,900 10,700 27,000 19,100 22,100
Crucial to this decision was the choice of the representative pe-
riod, " 3 since import levels and market share had varied significantly
106 Testimony on Title III of S. 1860 and S. 2099, before Senate Comm. on Finance, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (July 17, 1986) (statements of Ambassador Yeutter) [hereinafter Yeutter
Testimony] (source available from authors).
107 Proclamation No. 5727, 52 Fed. Reg. 38,075 (1987). See also Bivens, Harley-David-
son Climbing Back Into Saddle, Wash. Post, June 29, 1986, at F2, col. 1. Bivens noted that:
Since 1983, the company has slashed its work force in half and raised the
average productivity of its employees by 30 percent ....
After being flattened in its home market by foreign motorcycle produ-
cers-chiefly those from Japan-Harley-Davidson has capped a three-year re-
bound by moving into second place in the U.S. market for heavy
motorcycles....
108 Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, supra note 25.
109 With respect to stainless steel plate, Commissioner Stern dissented and found that
imports, although important, were not a substantial cause of serious injury. Id. at 33-37
(views of Comm'r Sfern).
110 Commissioners Stern and Haggart supported market-share quotas because
(1) other types of relief, such as tariffs, do not provide the certainty of protection that
quotas do, while (2) market-share quotas "automatically allow the quantity of imports to
adjust to fluctuations in market demand ..... Id. at 53-54.
111 Three years was considered a sufficient period for the domestic industry to adjust
to changing conditions of competition. Id. at 54 (views of Chairman Eckes). See also id. at
44-45 (views of Comm'rs Stern and Haggart). The relief period was made retroactive to
January 1, 1983, to avoid any possible "rush to beat the imposition of relief." Id. at 45.
112 Id. at 39 (views of Comm'rs Stern and Haggart).
113 There was a number of other important issues in this recommendation, including
how the quotas would be allocated (either on a country-by-country basis or on a country-
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in recent years." t4 Commissioners Stem and Haggart recommended
a representative period of 1972 to 1982, excluding the years 1975
and 1982.' t 5 In recommending this period, they argued first that
there was no truly representative period; 1 6 second, that a longer
time period was preferable in light of distorted import levels; 117 and
third, their proposed remedy would match the import relief provided
to the relative impact of the imports.I"
In his minority view, Chairman Eckes recommended a represen-
tative period of 1979 to 1981. He argued first that it was consistent
with recent Commission practice."t 9 Second, he maintained that
from 1978 to 1981, imports essentially responded to the free opera-
tion of supply and demand in the world market. Third, he noted that
imports from 1972 to 1982 had already been subject to review under
the trade laws. Finally, he submitted that the Commission's pro-
posed remedy for alloy tool steel was too restrictive and for stainless
by-country basis with a basket quota open to all other suppliers) and which products
should be exempted from any import relief. See id. at 39-52.
114 As Chairman Eckes stated:
the choice of a recent representative period is of fundamental importance to
shaping the appropriate level of relief, because selection of this period oper-
ates to establish floor figures for import levels and the market-share
percentages.
Id. at 57 (views of Chairman Eckes). See also id. at 40 (views of Comm'rs Stem and Hag-
gart). The 1974 Act provides:
Any quantitative restriction proclaimed ... and any orderly marketing agree-
ment negotiated ... shall permit the importation of a quantity or value of the
article which is not less than the quantity or value of such article imported
into the United States during the most recent period which the President
determines is representative of imports of such article.
19 U.S.C. § 2253(d)(1) (Supp. III 1985).
115 The years 1975 and 1982 were excluded because those were years in which serious
injury was caused by imports. Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, supra note 25, at 40
(views of Comm'rs Stern and Haggart).
116 Distortions in the market for specialty steel were created by quotas, voluntary re-
straint arrangements, price controls, and various economic conditions such as a worldwide
steel shortage, "exceptionally high inflation rates, a construction boom, the termination of
quotas, a mini-recession, exceptionally low dollar exchange rates, exceptionally high real
interest rates, and the nearly complete turn around in both inflation and dollar value in a
short time." Id. at 43-44 (views of Comm'rs Stem and Haggart).
117 Id. at 44 (views of Comm'rs Stern and Haggart).
118 Commissioner Stern was particularly concerned that, under Chairman Eckes' pro-
posed remedy, the industry which she considered least injured (stainless steel plate) would
receive the strongest relief. Id. at 92-94 (views of Comm'r Stern).
119 Chairman Eckes states that the remedy recommendation of Commissioners Stern
and Haggart-
deviates from recent Commission practice. Since section 201 was amended
in the Trade Act of 1974, the Commission in recommending quotas has
based its proposal on the most recent years of non-injurious imports. These
are the years immediately preceding the period in which the Commission has
found increased imports to be a substantial cause of serious injury. Ordina-
rily Commissioners have chosen a recent two to five year representative pe-
riod, or elected to exclude one or more years from the period as
representative, as my colleagues have done.
Id. at 58.
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steel plate not restrictive enough. 120
2. Presidential Decision
The President proclaimed import relief, but modified its form
and duration from that recommended by the Commission. He pro-
vided relief for four years rather than three, "to provide time for the
industry to complete important investment projects, improve pro-
ductivity, and regain profitability."' 12 1 Relief took the form of a
"combination of tariffs and quotas."' 22 Tariffs applied to sheet,
strip, and plate were at levels less restrictive than those recom-
mended by the Commission. The President reasoned that producers
of flat-rolled products were more competitive than other stainless
steel products, which were subject to greater import competition.
The President further noted that recently the former had success-
fully used the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws to ob-
tain offsetting duties on unfairly traded imports from three principal
foreign competitors. 123 The President, therefore, concluded that
producers of nonflat-rolled products needed greater relief to enable
them to make necessary investments. 124
The President established quotas for imports of stainless bar,
rod, and tool steel. The four-year global quotas implemented the
Commission's proposed minimum import quantities in the first year,
and allowed imports to expand at a rate of three percent annually.
The history of this section 201 case is important to understand-
ing the President's decision. The U.S. Trade Representative had ini-
tiated investigations under section 302 of the 1974 Act 125 in
February12 6 and August of 1982127 in response to petitions filed by
the Tool and Stainless Steel Industry Committee and the United
Steelworkers of America. 128 Under section 301 of the 1974 Act, 129
the President directed the U.S. Trade Representative to ask the
120 Commissioners Stern and Haggert, on the other hand, maintained that rigid ad-
herence to a single representative period for a number of industries can create undesirable
anomalies. Cf Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, supra note 25, at 57-61 (views of
Comm'r Eckes). See Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products, supra note 26.
121 Memorandum of July 5, 1983, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,177 (1983); see also Proclamation
No. 5074, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,233 (1983).
122 Letter to Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate on Import Relief
for the Specialty Steel Industry, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1016 (1983) [hereinafter Specialty Steel
Import Relief Message].
123 Id. at 1017; see supra note 8.
124 Specialty Steel Import Relief Message, supra note 122, at 1017.
125 19 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982).
126 Tool and Stainless Steel Industry Committee and United Steelworkers of America,
initiation of Investigation on Petition Filed Seeking Relief, 47 Fed. Reg. 10,107 (1982).
127 Tool and Stainless Steel Industry Committee and United Steelworkers of America,
initiation of Investigation on Petition Filed Seeking Relief, 47 Fed. Reg. 35,387 (1982).
128 Petitioners principally alleged that the European Community, Belgium, France, It-
aly, the United Kingdom, Austria, and Sweden had subsidized the production of specialty
steel in a manner inconsistent with the Agreement on Interpretation and Application of
19881
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Commission to conduct an expedited investigation under section
201. As a part of the President's determination under section 301,
he stated: "The injury to the domestic industry is clear.' i30 The
President based his conclusion on the "[fight] for survival" by many
U.S. firms, despite U.S. industry's efficiency, modem technology,
and innovation.' 3 1 While he recognized that the recession ac-
counted for part of the problem, nonetheless he focused on increas-
ing imports and their depressing effect on operating rates,
employment, prices, and revenues.' 3 2 Following the Commission's
affirmative determination of injury, 133 the President granted import
relief.
The President's decision emphasized the unfairness of the prac-
tices of foreign governments and foreign specialty steel suppliers,
thus underscoring the distinction between the "fair trade" statute
(section 201) and unfair trade statutes (e.g., section 301134 and the
antidumping and countervailing duty laws' 35).' 3 6
3. Subsequent Developments
In 1983, U.S, Trade Representative Brock announced the con-
clusion of orderly marketing agreements for stainless steel bar, rod,
and alloy tool steel exports from Sweden, Austria, Japan, Canada,
Poland, Argentina, and Spain.' 3 7 In early 1984, the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) retaliated by restricting imports into mem-
ber states of the EEC of certain alarm systems, sporting goods, and
Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12,
1979, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619 [hereinafter the Subsidies Code].
129 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411 (1982)).
130 Memorandum of Nov. 16, 1982, 47 Fed. Reg. 51,717 (1982).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 51,717-18.
133 See supra note 124.
134 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. III 1985).
135 See supra note 8.
136 49 Fed. Reg. 36,813 (1984). In its press release, USTR offered the following
analysis:
Trade problems in the specialty steel area have been widespread. These dif-
ficulties stem from persistent excess productive capacity, some of it uneco-
nomic and unsupported by subsidies, as well as trade restrictive and
distortive practices used by many of our trading partners to protect their
industries and stimulate exports.
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement by U.S. Trade Representative Brock
(July 5, 1983) (source available from author). See also the President's decision concerning
Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products, supra note 26, infra notes 154-58 and accompa-
nying text.
137 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Brock Concludes Specialty Steel Quota Arrange-
ments with Seven Countries (Oct. 19, 1983) (source available from author).
19 U.S.C. § 2253(e)(1) (1982 Supp. III 1985) provides that if the President announces
his intention to negotiate orderly marketing agreements, "import relief shall be pro-
claimed and take effect within 90 days after the import relief determination date."
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petrochemicals. 13 8
Following the President's announcement of his national policy
for the steel industry,' 3 9 the U.S. Trade Representative concluded
agreements with fifteen countries and the EEC. 140 Among other
things, these agreements incorporated the orderly marketing agree-
ments on stainless steel bar, rod, and alloy tool steel and replaced
the increased tariffs on imports of stainless steel sheets, strip, and
plate with quotas.
C. Carbon Steel
1. Commission Recommendation
In Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products,14 1 the Commission de-
termined that an increase in imports was a substantial cause of seri-
ous injury to the following industries: producers of semi-finished
goods (ingots, blooms, billets, slabs, and sheet bars), 142 plates,
sheets and strip, wire and wire products, and structural shapes and
units. 143 The Commission made negative findings for the following
industries: producers of wire rod, railway-type products, bars, and
pipes and tubes. 144
The Commission 45 recommended that the President proclaim
five years 146 of import relief, as follows: (1) a tariff-rate quota on
imported semi-finished products, 147 (2) market-share quotas on im-
ported sheet and strip, plate, structural shapes and units (excluding
138 Council Regulation (EEC) 21 O.J. Eut. COMM. (No. 140), art. 1, at 1-2 (1984).
'39 49 Fed. Reg. 36,813 (1984), 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1307 (Sept. 20, 1984).
140 See infra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
141 See supra note 26.
142 Commissioners Lodwick and Rohr found a threat of serious injury; Commissioner
Eckes found present injury. Id. at 56.
143 In each of these industries where the Commission's vote was affirmative, Commis-
sioners Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr found injury; Chairwoman Stern and Vice Chairman
Liebeler did not. Id. at 87, 130.
144 For each of the negative determinations, the vote was unanimous except in the
case of pipes and tubes, where Commissioners Eckes and Rohr voted in the affirmative;
Chairwoman Stern, Vice Chairman Liebeler, and Commissioner Lodwick voted in the neg-
ative. Id. at 65, 68, 117, 155.
145 The Commission's import relief recommendation was presented by Commission-
ers Eckes, Lodwick and Rohr. Id. at 71-79. In opposing any form of import relief, Chair-
woman Stern argued that: (1) imports were not the most critical problem facing the
American steel industry, and (2) the majority's recommendation was "more likely to in-
hibit rather than enhance the overdue efforts of U.S. steel producers to adjust to condi-
tions of competition of the 1980's." Id. at 119-29. Vice Chairman Liebeler also opposed
import relief. Id. at 155-65 (views of Vice Chairman Liebeler).
146 The majority believed that, given the size of the investment required for moderni-
zation of facilities and the time for such items as continuous casters to become operational,
a shorter period of relief would be effective. Id. at 78-79.
147 Many inside and outside of the U.S. industry felt that unrestrained access to cheap
semi-finished imports could reduce the incentive for integrated producers to modernize
their facilities. This would have a large impact on jobs; over half of all U.S. steelworkers
were employed in semi-finished production at the time.
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light structurals), and wire,' 4 8 and tariffs on imported wire prod-
ucts. 1 49 The following table summarizes the recommendation:
Product Remedy Imports at Existing Duty Additional Duty
Years 1-3 Years 4-5
Semi- Tariff-
finished rate quota 1.5 million tons 15 percent 10 percent
Wire
products Tariff 12 percent 10 percent
Product
Sheet and
strip products
Hot-rolled
Cold-rolled
Galvanized
Other sheet
and strip
Plates
Structurals
Wire
150
Remedy
Quota
Quota
Quota
Quota
Quota
Quota
Quota
Level
Years 1-3 Years 4-5
11 percent
10.6 percent
21.4 percent
6.4 percent
21.2 percent
28.9 percent
24.5 percent
12.1 percent
11.7 percent
23.5 percent
7.0 percent
23.3 percent
31.8 percent
26.9 percent
Minimum Quantity
1.8 million tons
1.9 million tons
1.6 million tons
400,000 tons
2.1 million tons
2.1 million tons
400.000 tons
The minimum import levels in the Commission's recommended
remedy are based on a representative period of 1979-1981. The
Commission's application of a uniform representative period for all
industries for which quotas were recommended created import levels
contrary to the apparent needs of the domestic industry and U.S.
consumers. 151
Commissioners Lodwick and Rohr recommended that "import
relief be conditioned on adjustment plans that describe how the pe-
riod of relief will be used to 'facilitate an orderly adjustment to im-
port competition.'" Vice Chairman Liebeler, who found no injury
148 Id. at 72.
149 Tariffs were considered to be preferable to quotas for wire products because there
is a vast array of wire products and quotas would be difficult to determine and administer.
Id. at 76-77.
150 Id. at 72.
151 During the summer of 1984, in the midst of strong economic recovery, there was a
surge in demand for cold rolled sheet that the domestic industry could not fully meet.
Conversely, the plate industry had scarcely felt the effects of the recovery and continued to
be in substantial difficulty. Yet by rigidly adhering to the 1979-1981 base period, the
Commission's recommendation would have provided no relief to the plate industry which
needed it badly (market share quota and minimum share amounts were substantially in
excess of those that prevailed in 1982 and 1983), and far more relief than was needed by
the sheet and strip industry.
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and recommended no import relief, proposed that import relief, if
granted, should be conditioned on a twenty percent compensation
cut to the steel workers.' 52 Commissioner Eckes opposed such
"conditionality," on the grounds that it would be "inconsistent with
[the Commission's] statutes, mandate and its traditional role as a fact
finding, not a policy-making, agency."' 153
2. Presidential Decision
In addressing this case, the President faced a difficult policy di-
lemma. If he rejected relief, he would be criticized for ignoring:
(1) the serious injury to the U.S. industry and its importance to over-
all U.S. economic and national security interests; (2) unfair foreign
trade practices; and (3) the risk of legislation limiting steel im-
ports 154 or removing Presidential discretion under section 201.
Conversely, if he provided relief, he would be criticized for ignoring:
(1) earlier commitments to resist protectionist measures, (2) the
prospect of compensation or retaliation, and (3) the increased costs
to steel consumers (e.g., automobile and machine tool producers),
who would be placed at a competitive disadvantage.
Within the Administration, there was extensive debate whether
relief should be provided outside of section 201. The principal prob-
lem with relief under section 201 was that it would fail to provide
comprehensive relief to the industry. Section 201 relief would create
an enormous diversion of imports from the products covered by re-
lief to those not covered because the Commission had found no in-
jury (particularly pipe and tube, wire rod, and bars). But many
feared that relief outside the context of section 201 could place the
United States on the slippery slope toward a Multifiber Arrangement
for steel. Import restraint actions outside the context of section 201
lack the discipline on duration, product coverage, transparency, and
minimum import levels provided by section 201 procedures.
Ultimately, the President decided to establish a government pol-
icy for the industry. He directed the U.S. Trade Representative to:
negotiate "surge control" arrangements or understandings ... with
countries whose exports to the United States have increased signifi-
cantly in recent years due to an unfair surge in imports-unfair be-
cause of dumping, subsidization, or diversion from other importing
countries who have restricted access to their markets.1 5 5
As in Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, 156 the Administration em-
152 Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products, supra note 26, at 162-63 (views of Vice
Chairman Liebeler).
153 Id. at 82-85 (views of Comm'r Eckes).
154 For a discussion of the factors to consider in a section 201 case, see H.R. REP. No.
571, supra note 7, at 49.
155 49 Fed. Reg. 36,813 (1984).
156 See supra note 25.
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phasized the need to address unfair foreign trade practices. 157
The President also expressed the hope that this combination of
actions would result in the market seeking "a return to a more nor-
mal level of steel imports, or approximately 18.5%, excluding semi-
finished steel."' 58
3. Subsequent Developments
Since the President's announcement in September 1984 agree-
ments have been signed with twenty countries.' 59 Each agreement
has a similar structure, being effective until September 30, 1989.160
While steel imports were 27% of apparent consumption in
1984, they declined to 26% in 1985, 23% in 1986, and 21% in
1987.161
D. Copper
1. Commission Recommendation
In the Copper case the Commission found that increased imports
caused serious injury to the domestic industry.' 62 In fashioning a
remedy, the Commission faced an industry experiencing "decreased
demand for copper, high inventories, high domestic production
costs, and a depressed world price."' 63 Chairwoman Stern noted
that the industry suffered from a comparative disadvantage: lower
quality ore, steeper energy and environmental costs, and higher
wages.164
157 In addition to the President's statement, Ambassador Brock noted "an 'unprece-
dented and unacceptable' surge of imported steel as a result of (1) diversion of steel im-
ports into the U.S. markets due to quotas and import restraints in other nations, and
(2) massive unfair trade practices such as subsidies and predatory below-market pricing, or
dumping." Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Brock Announces President's Steel Decision
(Sept. 18, 1984) (source available from authors).
158 49 Fed. Reg. at 36,814.
159 Agreements have been signed with Australia, Austria, Brazil, China, Czechoslova-
kia, East Germany, the European Economic Community (EEC), Finland, Hungary, Japan,
Mexico, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Trinidad, Vene-
zuela, and Yugoslavia.
160 Market shares negotiated with each country are: Australia (0.18%), Austria
(0.21%), Brazil (0.8%), the EEC (5.4%), Finland (0.224%), Japan (5.89%), Mexico
(0.36%), South Africa (0.42%), South Korea (1.9%), and Spain (0.67%). Specific tonnage
agreements have been negotiated with: China (68,000 tons), Czechoslovakia (40,000
tons), East Germany (110,000 tons), Hungary (34,000 tons), Poland (90,000 tons), Portu-
gal (40,000 tons), Romania (150,000 tons), Trinidad (73,500 tons), Venezuela (180,000
tons), and Yugoslavia (25,200 tons).
161 Monthly Reports on the Status of the Steel Industry, USITC Pub. 2007, Inv. No.
332-226 (Sept. 1987).
162 Unwrought Copper, supra note 73, at I. Vice Chairman Liebeler and Commission-
ers Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr made this finding; Chairwoman Stern found that increasing
imports threaten to cause further serious injury.
1(14 Id. at 6 (views of Comm'rs Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr).
164 U.S. ore grade is lower quality than that of many foreign suppliers, and it
therefore costs more for U.S. producers to extract the same amount of cop-
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The Commission had a difficult task to devise a recommendation
that would "prevent or remedy" 165 the serious injury suffered by the
industry and "facilitate orderly adjustment to import competi-
tion." 166 Commissioners Eckes and Lodwick recommended a five-
year quota of 425,000 short tons per year.' 67 Commissioners Stern
and Rohr recommended an additional five cent per pound tariff for
copper for five years. 168
2. Presidential Decision
The President did not find import relief to be in the national
economic interest. First, he determined that restricting imports-
whether through quotas, tariffs or orderly marketing agreements-
would create a differential between U.S. and world copper prices.
The higher U.S. price would harm the copper-fabricating industry in
the United States (including an estimated 106,000 workers in 1983),
by giving its foreign competitors a significant price advantage. Over
time, demand for copper in the United States would decline, thus
exacerbating the serious problems faced by U.S. copper
producers. 69
Second, the President found that import relief would adversely
affect the export earnings of the foreign copper-producing countries,
many of which (such as Chile, Zambia, and Zaire) were heavily in-
debted and highly dependent on copper exports. 170
The Administration also considered but rejected petitioners'
proposal that the United States negotiate commitments from key ex-
porting countries to reduce substantially annual copper production.
per from a given quantity of ore. Energy costs are higher for U.S. producers,
both because these costs have risen and because U.S. mines are necessarily
more energy intensive. Environmental costs are higher in the United States.
And wages for U.S. copper workers are higher than those of their foreign
counterparts .... Indeed, when total average operating costs per pound of
refined copper are calculated for U.S. producers and all other foreign produ-
cers, the difference is about 23 percent. Most U.S. producers need a price of
about 80 to 95 cents to cover costs, while copper producers in Chile, the
most source of imports, require a price of only 45-50 cents per pound to
break even.
Id. at 23, 31.
165 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(l)(A) (1982 Supp. 1II 1985).
166 S. REP. No. 1298, supra note 6, at 126. Vice Chairman Liebeler concluded that
none of the relief alternatives available to the Commission would facilitate an adjustment
to import competition. She therefore took the unprecedented step of recommending
against relief (despite her finding of serious injury), but expressed a preference for a tariff
approach if relief were provided. Unwrought Copper, supra note 73, at 65-71 (views of
Vice Chairman Liebeler).
167 Unwrought Copper, supra note 73, at 19 (views of Comm'rs Eckes and Lodwick).
They recommend that the aggregate amount be allocated to allow for 375,000 short tons
of unwrought copper, including a separate allocation of 25,000 short tons of wire bar; and
for 50,000 short tons of black, blister, and anode copper.
168 Id. at 47-52 (views of Chairwoman Stern and Comm'r Rohr).
169 49 Fed. Reg. 35,609 (1984).
170 Id.
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First, such efforts would have been inconsistent with the Administra-
tion's market-oriented trade and commodity policy objectives. Sec-
ond, negotiation of such reduction would have been very difficult, at
best. And finally, even if reductions in production were negotiated,
most economists doubted that they would be effective.
E. Footwear
1. Commission Recommendation
In Footwear,'71 the Commission unanimously found that in-
creased imports were a substantial cause of serious injury or threat
thereof to the U.S. industry.172 The Commission 73 recommended
that quotas be imposed on imports of nonrubber footwear with a
customs value over $2.50 a pair for five years. 174 Chairwoman Stern
and Commissioner Rohr recommended that the quota be divided
into three segments.' 75
The Commission recommended quotas as opposed to tariffs be-
171 Footwear IV, supra note 29. This case was preceded by Footwear III, supra note 23,
where the Commission unanimously found no injury; Footwear II, supra note 30, where the
Commission found injury and President Carter negotiated orderly market agreements with
Taiwan and Korea; and Footwear I, supra note 94, where the Commission found injury and
President Ford found that adjustment assistance was the most effective remedy for the
industry's injury.
172 Chairwoman Stern and Vice Chairman Liebeler found that increased imports were
a substantial cause of a threat of serious injury. Footwear IV, supra note 29, at 5-23 (views
of Chairwoman Stern), 25-53 (views of Vice Chairman Liebeler). Commissioners Eckes,
Lodwick, and Rohr found the increased imports were a substantial cause of present serious
injury. Id. at 55-75 (views of Comm'r Eckes), 77-89 (views of Comm'r Lodwick on injury),
and 91-113 (views of Comm'r Rohr on injury).
173 Vice Chairman Liebeler recommended against import relief. Id. at 171-205 (rem-
edy views of Vice Chairman Liebeler), as she did in Unwrought Copper, supra note 73, at
71. Instead, she recommended that the President provide adjustment assistance. Foot-
wear IV, supra note 29, at 204.
174 The following table shows the quantity of footwear imports which would be al-
lowed in each of the final five years:
Year Quantity (in millions of pairs)
First 474
Second 474
Third 488
Fourth 517
Fifth 564
Footwear IV, supra note 29, at 2.
175 The recommendation of Chairwoman Stern and Commissioner Rohr was as
follows:
Year Licenses type (millions of pairs)
A B C
First 150 214 110
Second 150 214 110
Third 155 220 113
Fourth 164 233 120
Fifth 179 254 131
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cause the volume of imports, rather than price factors, affected the
condition of the domestic industry.' 76 They excluded footwear val-
ued at less than $2.50 per pair because domestic producers could not
meet the consumer demand for low cost footwear. If the Commis-
sion imposed relief on all footwear, foreign suppliers would move
into the higher-value product lines to compensate for the loss in the
volume of shipments. Relief would fall disproportionately on the
low-cost sector, with little relief to the higher value products. 177
2. Presidential Decision
The President's decision in the Footwear case was made amid in-
tense congressional pressure. Thirty-nine Senators and 167 Repre-
sentatives supported relief, arguing that this was a "classic" section
201 case. Nonetheless, the President decided that import relief was
not in the national economic interest for three reasons. First, the
President concluded that quotas would not help the industry become
more competitive. The President cited the industry's failure to ad-
just during a prior period of import protection, and conversely some
signs of adjustment while unprotected by quotas. 178
Second, the President considered the consumer burden of im-
port relief to be unjustifiable. He noted the Council of Economic
Advisors' estimate that consumer costs could total $2.9 billion over
the next five years. This amounted to an annual cost of $26,300 for
each average $14,000 job saved. 179
Third, the President cited as much as $2.1 billion in U.S. trade
damage as a result of compensatory U.S. tariff reductions or retalia-
tion by governments of foreign suppliers. Brazil, an important mar-
where A= nonathletic footwear valued over $2.50 but not over $5.00 per pair; B=
nonathletic footwear valued over $5.00 per pair, and C= athletic footwear valued over
$2.50 per pair. Id. at 2.
Licenses for athletic footwear would be reserved only for athletic footwear;
licenses for athletic footwear over $2.50 per pair but not over $5.00 per pair
could also be used for athletic footwear; licenses for nonathletic footwear
valued over $5.00 could be used for any footwear subject to the quota.
Id.
176 Id. at 115 (views of Chairwoman Stern and Comm'rs Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr
regarding remedy).
177 Id. at 116-17 (views of Chairwoman Stern and Comm'rs Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr
regarding remedy).
178 The President said:
Between 1977 and 1981, U.S. footwear manufacturers received protection
from foreign imports, but emerged from that period even more vulnerable to
international competition than before. In fact, while unprotected by quotas,
the shoe industry has begun to show positive signs of adjustment. Producers
have invested in state of the art manufacturing equipment, modernizing their
operations, and diversifying into profitable retail operations.
President's White House Statement at 1, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1008 (Aug. 28,
1985).
179 Nonrubber Footwear Import Relief Determination, Memorandum of Aug. 28,
1985, for the United States Trade Representative, 50 Fed. Reg. 35,205 (1985).
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ket for U.S. exports, would have been particularly hard hit.'80
F. Wood Shakes and Shingles
1. Commission Recommendation
In Wood Shakes and Shingles,' 8 ' Chairwoman Stern and Commis-
sioners Eckes, Lodwick and Rohr found that increased imports were
a "substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic industry."' 8 2
Commissioners Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr recommended a five-
year,' 8 3 35% tariff on imports of western red cedar shingles and
shakes. They estimated that such a tariff would have increased do-
mestic prices by 10.5% had it been in effect in 1984. They believed
"this effect best approximates the decline in prices attributable to
increased imports in the recent period, and would restrict imports to
historical levels." 84
Chairwoman Stern opposed a 35% (and any other) import re-
lief. She argued that it would result in "miniscule changes in pro-
duction and minor increases in employment."'' 8 5 Moreover, she
argued, it would likely be counterproductive, as demand would be
shifted to cheaper, substitute, fire-resistant products. 186 Instead, she
proposed adjustment assistance.' 8 7
Vice Chairman Liebeler and Commissioner Brunsdale agreed
with Chairwoman Stern that temporary import relief would not pre-
vent or remedy the injury suffered by the industry. Commissioner
Brunsdale supported adjustment assistance in the form of job train-
ing and relocation assistance. Vice Chairman Liebeler did not rec-
ommend adjustment assistance, but found it preferable to a 35%
tariff. '8 8
18o Id.
181 Wood Shakes and Shingles, supra note 27.
182 Id. at 3, 7-8. Vice Chairman Liebler and Commissioner Brunsdale found that the
industry was seriously injured, but that the contraction in U.S. domestic demand was a
more important cause than increased imports. Id. at 53-73 (views of Vice Chairman
Liebeler and Comm'r Brunsdale).
183 Id. at 20. Because of the difficulty in predicting housing construction, they con-
cluded it would not be "feasible to reduce the proposed tariff over the relief period." Id.
(views of Comm'rs Eckes, Lodwick and Rohr with respect to remedy).
184 Id. at 20 (views of Comm'rs Eckes, Lodwick and Rohr with respect to remedy).
185 Id. at 34. Chairwoman Stern indicated that "a 35 percent tariff would have a nega-
tive effect on production, while increasing the workforce by between 24 and 183 workers."
Id. (views of Chairwoman Stern).
186 Id. at 35. Chairwoman Stern predicted that "after a 35 percent tariff for five years,
demand would fall between 25 percent and 34 percent." Id. (views of Chairwoman Stern).
187 Id. at 37-39. Commissioners Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr rejected adjustment assist-
ance, noting that it had been criticized as both ineffectively administered, and inadequately
funded. Id. at 21 (views of Comm'rs Eckes, Lodwick, and Rohr with respect to remedy).
188 Id. at 79-80 (views of Vice Chairman Liebeler and Comm'r Brunsdale).
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2. Presidential Decision
The President provided a five-year tariff program with a duty of
35% for the first thirty months, 20% for months thirty-one through
fifty-four, and 8% for months fifty-five through sixty. He directed
the Commission to provide an interim report on the economic effect
of terminating relief at the end of thirty months.' 8 9
In announcing the decision, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative
Smith cited dramatic increases in these imports in recent years and a
substantial drop in domestic production, profits, and employment.
He stated the President's import relief program would enable the
U.S. industry to increase its search for alternative raw materials and
improved anti-flammability, to the benefit of U.S. consumers. 190
This case had a certain populist appeal, because it was filed by a
small industry without the aid of Washington lawyers, and entailed
relatively low costs to consumers.' 9' It was the first section 201 case
considered by the President after his controversial Footwear deci-
sion, 19 2 at a time when Congress was seriously considering legisla-
tive proposals to restrict the President's discretion under section
201.193 Because the U.S. tariff on wood shakes and shingles is not
bound under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATf),
the United States was not required to compensate its trading part-
ners for any resulting trade damage. All these factors improved the
prospects for import relief.
Almost all U.S. imports of cedar shakes and shingles came from
Canada. While the Canadians had no legal right to challenge the
U.S. action in the GATT, they nevertheless imposed a series of tariff
increases in response to the U.S. action. 19 4
189 Western Red Cedar Shakes and Shingles Import Relief Determination, Memoran-
dum of May 23, 1986, for the United States Trade Representative, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,157
(1986). The President stated his intent to continue relief for the full five-year period if
market conditions warranted and domestic producers made reasonable progress toward
adjustment. Id.
190 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, President Grants Import Relief to U.S. Western
Red Cedar Shakes and Shingles Industry (May 22, 1986) (source available from author).
191 Estimates of consumer cost ranged from $6.1 million to $25.4 million.
192 Footwear IV, supra note 29.
193 See infra notes 195-239 and accompanying text.
194 The Canadian tariff increases were on certain books; periodicals and miscellaneous
published items; computer parts; semiconductors; diesel motor rail cars, units and chassis;
and some tea, oats products, trees, cider and ozone generators or airfilters. See Mulroney
Furious'At Reagan Approval of Lumber Tariffs, N.Y. Times, May 24, 1986, at 1, col. 1; Canada
Weighs Steps to Counter U.S. Trade Moves, Wall St.J., May 27, 1986, at 3, col. 1; Wall St. J.,
May 28, 1986, at 4, col. 2; U.S. Reaffirms Trade Committment to Canada But JlWon't End Shingle
Levy, Wall St. J., June 2, 1986, at 4, col. 3; Canada Imposes Levies To Check New U.S. Tariff,
Wall St. J., June 3, 1986, at 18, col. i; and U.S. Move on Canada Doubted, N.Y. Times, June 4,
1986, at DI, col. 6.
1988] 213
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
IV. Legislative Proposals to Amend Section 201
The 99th Congress considered a number of proposals to amend
section 201. The most significant of these were contained in H.R.
4750,19 5 S. 1860,196 S. 2099,197 and proposals prepared by the staff
of the Senate Finance Committee. 9 8 While these proposals differed
in important respects, they also contained a number of common ele-
ments. Each of the proposals emphasized improving the effective-
ness of section 201 relief in promoting adjustment to import
competition. Most of the proposals restricted the President's au-
thority and discretion under section 201. They also proposed other
amendments, such as emergency relief for perishable products, pro-
visional relief in critical circumstances, a broader definition of seri-
ous injury or threat of serious injury, and a requirement for
estimates of the impact of relief on consumers.
A. Emphasis on Adjustment
In describing several adjustment-oriented provisions in H.R.
4750, the House Ways and Means Committee underscored in several
ways its desire to use section 201 to promote adjustment. First, the
Committee noted that the establishment of an adjustment advisory
group-composed of representatives of business, labor, govern-
ment, communities, and consumers-would be a positive step to-
ward making section 201 a more effective adjustment tool. 19 9
Second, it stressed that domestic industries seeking temporary im-
port relief must not only indicate their willingness to use the period
of relief for adjustment, but also demonstrate actual progress toward
such adjustment. For this purpose, H.R. 4750 would have required
the Commission to review and report on the domestic industry's ad-
195 H.R. 4750 was originally reported by the House Ways and Means Committee on
May 6, 1986. 132 CONG. REc. H2417 (daily ed. May 6, 1986). H.R. 4750 was incorporated
into H.R. 4800, which passed the House of Representatives on May 22, 1986, by a vote of
295 to 115. 132 CONG. REC. H3162, H3225 (daily ed. May 22, 1986).
196 S. 1860 was originally introduced by Senator Danforth and was cosponsored by 32
senators. 131 CONG. REC. S15,958 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985). The provisions relating to
section 201 were introduced separately as S. 1863 on the same day by Senator Mitchell,
cosponsored by 14 senators. Id. at S15,959.
197 S. 2099 was introduced by Senator Roth, with Senators Wallop and Durenberger
as cosponsors. 132 CONG. REC. S1579 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1986).
198 In September 1986, as the Senate Finance Committee prepared for markup of om-
nibus trade legislation, the staff prepared two documents for the Committee's considera-
tion. The first were "Staff Proposals" released on September 12, 1986 (source available
from author). The second was a side-by-side comparison of present law, H.R. 4800, Sen-
ate Bills, and Senate staff proposals on Sept. 18, 1986 (source available from author).
While these proposals were never formally introduced, the concepts embodied in them
were reviewed by key Senators, including Bob Packwood (R-Ore.), John C. Danforth (R-
Mo.), and Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tcx.), before they were presented to the Committee.
199 H.R. REP. No. 581, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1986) (explaining H.R. 4750, supra
note 195, which created the right to have established industry adjustment advisory groups
prepare industry adjustment plans in section 201 cases). Id.
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justment efforts annually beginning after the second year of import
relief. The Committee envisaged that this information would be use-
ful to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative in determining
whether import relief should be modified, terminated, or
extended. 200
The various legislative proposals would have required height-
ened attention to industry adjustment plans, expansion of the op-
tions for relief under section 201, and follow-up by the Commission
and the Executive Branch following the provision of import relief.
1. Adjustment Plans
Each of the major legislative proposals amending section 201
either would have required adjustment plans or provided optional
procedures. Senate bill 2099, for example, required that all section
201 petitions include an adjustment proposal, including objectives,
goals, timetable, and actions to be taken to meet these objectives. 20'
This provision of Senate bill 2099 was incorporated into the Senate
Finance Committee Staff Proposals. 20 2
House bill 4750203 and Senate bill 1860204 provided for elabo-
rate industry adjustment advisory groups that could be created at the
option of the petitioner. The Administration opposed the establish-
ment of boards with representatives of government, industry, and
labor (and others) to draw up adjustment plans. Ambassador Clay-
ton Yeutter explained the Administration's view that these proposals
would transform the Commission from an independent commission
into an industrial policy-making agency. He maintained that such
proposals were impractical and unworkable and would involve unac-
ceptable extensive governmental intervention in the economy.20 5
Moreover, Ambassador Yeutter stressed that there was no rea-
son to believe that government bureaucrats are better-equipped to
devise adjustment plans than business executives. He said that the
200 Id. at 80 (explaining H.R. 4750, supra note 195, which required the Commission to
report annually on the adjustment efforts of domestic industry following import relief).
201 S. 2099, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S1579, 1580 (daily ed. Feb. 25,
1986).
202 Supra note 198, at 3-4.
203 Section 141 of H.R. 4750, supra note 195, provides for advisory groups, chaired by
USTR, consisting of two to four representatives of workers, two to four representatives of
firms (at least one of which must be a representative of small business), one representative
of affected communities, one individual knowledgeable of special consumer concerns, and
one representative from the Departments of Labor, Commerce, and Agriculture (when an
agricultural product is involved). H.R. REp. No. 581, supra note 199, at 69.
204 131 Cong Rec. S15,958 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985). Section 305 of S. 1860 provided
for advisory groups, established by USTR, consisting of individuals designated by peti-
tioner and representing firms, workers and officials of USTR, the Departments of Labor
and Commerce, and any other heads of departments and agencies designated by USTR.
Id. at S 15,963.
205 Yeutter Testimony, supra note 106, at 4-5.
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marketplace allocates capital and human resources better than gov-
ernment bureaucrats would. Therefore, individual firms should
make their own adjustment plans, based on their own projections of
future market conditions and their willingness to commit the re-
sources needed to become internationally competitive. They, rather
than the government, should be held accountable by their sharehold-
ers for their success or failure in implementing those plans. 20 6 Some
proposals also would have required the Commission to hold hear-
ings on the adjustment plan,20 7 and the President to consider or fol-
low the adjustment proposal.208
In light of Congressional interest in ensuring that section 201
relief results in adjustment, the Senate Finance Committee staff pro-
posals were particularly noteworthy. The staff proposals stated that
"the standard for recommending and granting import relief would
be identical for both the ITC and the President (i.e., such action as
can reasonably be expected to lead to a domestic industry that can be
competitive without further import relief after expiration of such im-
port relief)." The effect of this change would have been to preclude
the Commission from recommending import relief unless it found
that the industry would be competitive at the end of the relief period.
In addition, the staff proposals would have required the President, if
he denied import relief, to grant Trade Adjustment Assistance in an
effort to facilitate adjustment.20 9
2. Additional Options for Import Relief,
Senate bill 1860 and the Senate Finance Committee staff pro-
posals included the following additional options for import relief
under section 201: (1) accelerated antidumping and countervailing
duty cases where appropriate; 210 (2) limited antitrust exemptions for
206 Id.
207 E.g., § 305(b)(2) of S. 1860, 131 CONG. REC. S15,958, S15,964 (daily ed. Nov. 20,
1985). Under section 305(b)(2) of S. 1860, id. at S15,964, the Commission would consider
whether there was a reasonable expectation that implementation of the adjustment plan
and associated commitments would enable the industry to adjust to import competition
and to be competitive without further import relief. If its determinations were affirmative,
under § 305(d), the President would be required to provide the relief recommended by
the Commission or substantially equivalent relief, unless he obtained congressional au-
thorization to do otherwise through a bill submitted to the Congress under fast track
procedures.
208 Id. at S 15,964.
209 See supra note 198.
210 See § 306 of S. 1860, 131 CONG. REC. S 15,965 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985); and Staff
Proposals, supra note 198 (providing for only expedited dumping cases). This provision
would treat a Commission determination of serious injury (with respect to global imports)
as an affirmative Commission determination of material injury (with respect to dumped or
subsidized imports from those countries subject to the antidumping or countervailing duty
investigation). The Administration objected to this provision because the statutory defini-
tion of industry in § 201 is different from that in Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930; the
Commission often defines the industry more broadly in a § 201 case than in an antidump-
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mergers and acquisitions in specified import-affected circum-
stances, 2' and (3) multilateral negotiations to address problems not
susceptible to unilateral solution, such as global oversupply or diver-
sion because of government targeting. 212
3. Follow-up to Relief
The proposals required the President to establish procedures
for monitoring achievement of the goals of the adjustment plan.2 13
Senate bill 2099 also would have barred any new section 201 investi-
gation for any industry granted relief under section 201 during two
nonconsecutive periods. 21 4
B. Restrictions on President's Authority
1. Transfer of Authority
The House bill (H.R. 4750) would have transferred decision-
making authority in section 201 cases from the President to the U.S.
Trade Representative. 215 The Administration opposed this provi-
ing or countervailing duty case. Moreover, a serious injury finding with regard to all im-
ports is not equivalent to a material injury finding with regard to only dumped or
subsidized imports.
211 See § 306 of S. 1860, 131 CONG. REc. S15,965 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985); S. 2099,
132 CONG. REC. S1579 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1986); and Staff Proposals, supra note 198.
These proposals would provide limited antitrust exemptions for mergers and acquisitions
reasonably related to enhancing competition with foreign competitors to whom market
share has been lost and that outweigh adverse competitive impact on the domestic market.
Such "double-dipping" of both import relief and antitrust exemptions could have a large
negative impact on both competition and consumer welfare.
212 See § 306 of S. 1860, 131 CONG. REc. S15,965 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985); S. 2099,
132 CONG. REC. S1579 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1986); and Staff Proposals, supra note 198.
Under the proposals in S. 1860 the President would have one year to negotiate. If negoti-
ations failed to provide substantial relief from the serious injury, the President would be
required to proclaim the relief originally recommended by the Commission unless he ob-
tained "fast track" legislation authorizing him to provide no relief or different relief.
213 See § 141 of H.R. 4750; § 305 of S. 1860, 131 CONG. REC. S15,964 (daily ed. Nov.
20, 1985); S. 2099, 132 CONG. REC. S1579 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1986).
214 Under S. 2099, relief would have been authorized for up to five years, with a possi-
ble extension of up to three years. After a two-year wait following the expiration of relief,
an industry could apply again for further relief. However, relief could be granted a second
time only to facilitate the orderly transfer of resources to alternative uses. The second
relief period would have a maximum duration of five years, with no possibility of exten-
sion.
The rationale of S. 2099 in this regard was to clarify that relief is for a limited dura-
tion, to put additional pressure on firms to adjust to import competition. Senator Roth
noted his concern that of the 58 § 201 investigations that had then taken place, 13 in-
volved industries that had been the subject of prior investigations. To avoid the use of
§ 201 as a mechanism for permanent protection of inefficient industries, S. 2099 would
have limited its availability more stringently than current law. 132 CONG. REc. S1581
(daily ed. Feb. 25, 1986).
215 See § 141 of H.R. 4750, supra note 195. The House Ways and Means Committee
report accompanying H.R. 4750 stated:
The purpose of these changes is to strengthen the role of the U.S. Trade
Representative in being the chief official in the executive branch whose sole
responsibility is to look after the international trade interests of the United
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sion on the grounds that it violated the GATT. Both H.R. 4800 and
S. 1860 would have raised tariffs or imposed quotas in violation of
tariff findings. 2 16
2. Requirement of Import Relief
As discussed above, 2 17 S. 1860 would have allowed (but not re-
quired) petitioner to submit the adjustment plan created by the tri-
partite plan development group. If petitioner did so and the
Commission found a reasonable expectation that the strategy, plus
industry commitments, would lead to a competitive domestic indus-
try by the time relief expired, then S. 1860 would have required the
President to provide the import relief recommended by the Commis-
sion or substantially equivalent relief. He would have been excused
from doing so only if Congress passed "fast track"2 18 legislation al-
lowing him to provide no relief or other relief.2 19
From the Administration's perspective, this limitation on Presi-
dential discretion was as controversial as any of the legislative pro-
posals considered in the 99th Congress. 2 20 Ambassador Yeutter told
the Senate Finance Committee that such curtailment of the Presi-
dent's discretion would put the Commission in the position of mak-
ing decisions with far-reaching foreign and domestic policy
implications.
Moreover, Ambassador Yeutter emphasized that the President
should be able to provide no or lesser escape clause relief, since it is
not without international and domestic repercussions. To the con-
trary, it has a cost in trade compensation or retaliation, often ironi-
cally borne by the most competitive U.S. industries, the aggressive
States. This statutory change in decision-making responsibility is not meant
to remove any Presidential power or to reduce the influence of the President
in making trade decisions. The U.S. Trade Representative is, after all, an
individual chosen by the President to act as his chief trade policymaker and
spokesperson. The Committee does not anticipate that the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative, who serves at the pleasure of the President, will make decisions
with which the President disagrees. The Committee does, however, have se-
rious concerns about the degree of control and influence which other mem-
bers of the executive branch currently have over trade policy decisions made
by the President under current procedures. This statutory change is
designed to ensure that the Administration official who is solely responsible
for the coordination and implementation of U.S. trade policy is directly ac-
countable for determination [sic] under U.S. trade laws.
H.R. REP. No. 581, supra note 199, at 68-69.
216 Id.
217 See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
218 See Koh, supra note 21, at 1202.
219 S. 1860 also included a provision (§ 307) to legislate import relief for the copper
and footwear industries. 131 CONG. REC. S15,965-66 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985).
220 While H.R. 4750, the House omnibus trade bill, was highly protectionist and dele-
gated the President's authority in § 201 cases to the U.S. Trade Representative, it retained
the flexibility to deny import relief in those cases where it was determined that relief would
not be in the national economic interest. See H.R. REP. No. 581, supra note 199, at 68.
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exporters. When import relief saves more jobs than it costs and
gives an industry a fighting chance to adjust and survive, the Admin-
istration would pay the price willingly. But when the costs are too
high and the benefits fleeting, the President must be able to refuse
since relief would not be in the national economic interest. 221
C. Other Proposed Changes to Section 201
In his September 23, 1985, speech to the President's Export
Council, President Reagan described emergency relief for perishable
agricultural products as a legislative change the Administration
would support. 222 Senate bill 1860223 and House bill 4800224 both
required fast-track relief for such products under section 201 if the
Secretary of Agriculture determines within fourteen (or twenty) days
that such relief is warranted, unless the President (or USTR) decides
within seven days that such relief is not in the national economic
interest.
The Administration opposed this provision on the grounds that
it violated the GATT. Both H.R. 4800 and S. 1860 would have
raised tariffs or imposed quotas in violation of tariff bindings.225
The approach in these two bills would have given hasty relief to
some industries even where the Commission later found no injury;
the United States would have had to pay compensation had to its
trading partners been adversely affected.
1. Provisional Import Relief
House bill 4800226 and Senate bill 1860227 included virtually
221 Yeutter Testimony, supra note 106, at 2-4.
222 President's Message to Business Leaders and Members of the President's Export
Council and the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1128, 1130 (Sept. 23, 1985).
223 Section 303 of S. 1860, 131 CONG. REC. S15,963 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985), pro-
vides fast-track relief where a § 201 petition is filed on a perishable product, if a petition
requests such relief and is also filed with USDA. The Secretary of Agriculture must decide
within 14 days whether such relief is warranted, and the President then has 7 days to deter-
mine whether such relief is in the national economic interest.
224 Section 233 of H.R. 4800, 132 CONG. REC. H3179 (daily ed.,May 22, 1986), pro-
vides fast-track import relief for perishable products if a request for such relief is made
during a § 201 case, if the Secretary of Agriculture decides within 20 days that such relief
is warranted, unless the U.S. Trade Representative decides within 7 days that such relief is
not in the national economic interest.
225 Supporters of the perishable product provisions of H.R. 4800 or S. 1860 have at-
tempted to justify its GATT legality by citing the fact that the Caribbean Basin Initiative
and the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area provide safeguard provisions for emergency relief
from imports of perishable products from those countries under fast-track procedures. See
United States-Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act of 1985, 19 U.S.C. § 2112
(1985). However, those relief provisions only removed a special trade preference and re-
stored the usual tariff; the provisions in H.R. 4800 and S. 1860 would have raised tariffs or
imposed quotas in violation of tariff bindings.
226 Section 233 of H.R. 4800, 132 CONG. REC. H3179 (daily ed. May 22, 1986), relates
to provisional import relief.
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identical provisional relief proposals. Section 302 of S. 1860, for ex-
ample, authorized provisional import relief before a finding of seri-
ous injury by the Commission, if the President found that "critical
circumstances" existed. He would find critical circumstances to exist
if a significant increase in imports (actual or relative to domestic pro-
duction) over a short period of time had led to circumstances in
which delay in the imposition of relief would cause damage to the
domestic industry which is difficult to remedy. 228
The Administration opposed this provision because it violated
the GATT. The GATT requires an objective finding of serious in-
jury caused by increased imports before any action can be taken
against imports. 229 If the United States were to take provisional ac-
tion, and the Commission later found no injury, the United States
would still owe compensation.
2. Threat of Serious Injury 230
Senate bill 2099 added the following additional factors for the
Commission to consider in determining threat of material injury:
(1) targeting, (2) existence of preliminary or final antidumping or
countervailing duty determinations on goods produced by the U.S.
industry, (3) lack of ability of U.S. firms to maintain adequate levels
of research and development, (4) the extent to which trade restraints
abroad divert exports to the United States, (5) rapid increase in mar-
ket penetration and the likelihood that it will increase the level of
serious injury, (6) increase in capacity, or unused capacity abroad,
(7) probability of price suppression or depression caused by imports,
and (8) potential for product shifting. H.R. 4750231 and S. 1860232
also included changes in the threat standard.
The Administration considered some of these additional factors
unnecessary; others it opposed. As already discussed, 233 to be con-
sistent with the GATT, threatened injury must be real and imminent.
227 Section 302 of S. 1860, 131 CONG. REC. S15,963 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985).
228 Id.
229 GATT, supra note 3, Art. XIX.
230 In addition to those changes relative to threat of serious injury, H.R. 4750, supra
note 195, would also change the definition of serious injury and threat of serious injury to
require that, in considering the inability of a significant number of firms to operate at a
reasonable level of profit, only the profitability of domestic production facilities is relevant.
Id.
231 H.R. 4750 added the following criteria: (1) decrease in market share, (2) extent to
which import restraints abroad divert exports to the United States, and (3) the inability of
U.S. producers to generate capital for modernization. Id.
232 S. 1860 added the following criteria: (1) decline in market share, (2) targeting,
(3) preliminary or final affirmative antidumping and countervailing duty determinations,
(4) inability of firms in the U.S. industry to maintain adequate levels of research and devel-
opment, and (5) the extent to which trade restraints abroad divert exports to the United
States § 301, 131 CONG. REC. S 15,962 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1985).
233 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the Administration considered it essential that the factors
should remain relevant to the question of whether injury is real and
imminent to the domestic industry. In particular, the Administration
was concerned about including the existence of antidumping or
countervailing duty determinations as such a factor. Such determi-
nations suggest that the threat of serious injury is reduced, not in-
creased, because the dumping or subsidization should be offset by
the application of antidumping or countervailing duties.
V. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Legislation
After considerable activity in the 99th Congress without resolu-
tion, the 100th Congress passed omnibus trade legislation. H.R.
4800234 was introduced in the House of Representatives without
change as H.R. 3 and passed by a vote of 290 to 137 on April 30,
1987.235 By a vote of 71 to 27, the Senate passed H.R. 3 as amended
on July 21, 1987.236 The two bodies proceeded to a mammoth 199-
member conference, which concluded its work on March 31,
1988.237 By a vote of 312 to 107, the House agreed to the confer-
ence report on April 21.238 By a vote of 63 to 36, the Senate so
agreed about a week later. 23 9
However, on May 24, 1988, the President vetoed the bill 2 40
largely because of its mandatory provisions regarding advance notice
of business closings and mass layoffs.24' The House voted 308 to
113 to override that veto, 242 but the Senate sustained it by a vote of
61 to 37.243 Nonetheless, at the time of this article's writing, the
prospects for trade legislation in 1988 still appear positive. The
President stated his support for a "second" trade bill, 24 4 and many
speculate that a second bill is likely to be passed.2 45 It is worthwhile,
234 See supra note 224.
235 133 CONG. REC. H2981 (daily ed. April 30, 1987).
236 133 CONG. REC. S10,372 (daily ed. July 21, 1987).
237 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988: Conference Report to Accom-
pany H.R. 3, H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
238 134 CONG. REC. H2375 (daily ed. April 21, 1988).
239 134 CONG. REC. S4926 (daily ed. April 27, 1988).
240 H.R. Doc. No. 200, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. 3531-32 (daily ed. May
24, 1988).
241 Sections 6401-6410 of H.R. 3, H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. at 459-63
(1988).
242 134 CONG. REc. H3553 (daily ed. May 24, 1988).
243 134 CONG. REC. S4291 (daily ed. June 8, 1988).
244 In his veto message, the President disapproved H.R. 3 "with sincere regret." He
stated unequivocally, "I want a trade bill," and he pledged to "continue to work vigorously
to secure sound legislation this year." He concluded: "I am committed to enactment of a
responsible trade bill this year .... I want to sign a trade bill this year. I urge prompt
action on a second bill immediately after Congress sustains my veto." 134 CONG. REC.
H3531-32 (daily ed. May 24, 1988).
245 Swoboda, Labor Won't Tryfor Compromise on Trade Bill, Wash. Post, June 3, 1988, at
GI, col. 5, GI0, col. 6.
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then, to review amendments to section 201 in the vetoed Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.246 While these changes are
not nearly so sweeping as many proposals made in the 99th and
100th Congresses, they included some significant developments.
Most importantly, H.R. 3 stressed the objective of facilitating ad-
justment to import competition. For example, it authorized the ITC
to seek information from firms and workers regarding steps they are
taking or plan to take to achieve a positive adjustment to import
competition, and provided an opportunity for firms, workers, and as-
sociations to submit voluntary adjustment plans and commitments
(after an affirmative ITC injury determination) regarding adjustment
actions.2 47 The Omnibus Trade Act authorized the ITC to recom-
mend relief to facilitate positive adjustment, 248 and generally re-
quired the ITC to make a determination as to injury within four
months, so as to leave sufficient time (normally two months) for its
remedy recommendation. 249 If the ITC found injury, the Omnibus
Trade Act required the President to take all appropriate and feasible
action to facilitate efforts by the domestic industry to make a positive
adjustment to import competition, unless he determined that such
relief was not in the national interest,250 and required the President
to consider various specified factors in determining whether import
relief would facilitate positive adjustment. 25 1 The act also added, as
a new remedy option, appropriate adjustment measures (beyond
normal trade adjustment assistance), 252 and required the ITC to
evaluate the effectiveness of any relief provided under section 201
after termination of the relief.253 Through these measures, H.R. 3
substantially improved the likelihood that section 201 will be used to
facilitate successful adjustment to import competition, and thus to
enhance competitiveness.
The Omnibus Trade legislation did not reduce significantly the
President's discretion in deciding whether or how to provide relief,
as several early versions of the trade legislation proposed. Ulti-
mately, the President retained the authority to decide not to provide
any relief under section 201, or to provide less relief than recom-
mended by the ITC, if he determined that such relief is not in the
national economic interest. 254
246 The provisions concerning section 210 are contained in section 1401 of H.R. 3,
H.R. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. at 125-43 (1988).
247 Id. at 126-27.
248 Id. at 133.
249 Id. at 128.
250 Id. at 135.
251 Id. at 135-36.
252 Id. at 133.
253 Id. at 140.
254 Id. at 135.
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Conclusion
The Reagan Administration's record in section 201 cases has
been subject to close scrutiny by the Congress. The last two Con-
gresses in particular entertained a large number of proposals for
changing section 201 and making it more likely the President would
provide relief if the ITC made an affirmative injury determination.
The legislative consensus developed to date, however, does not sub-
stantially reduce the President's discretion under this trade remedy.
Rather, it constructively emphasizes the role of section 201 relief in
facilitating a positive adjustment to import competition by U.S. in-
dustries seeking relief. If a trade bill is enacted in 1988, it is likely to
tread closely this careful path.

